University of Dayton Law Review
Volume 41

Number 2

Article 2

6-1-2016

International Human Rights Litigation after Bauman: The Viability
of Veil Piercing to Hale Foreign Parent Corporations into U.S.
Courts
Christopher Knight

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Knight, Christopher (2016) "International Human Rights Litigation after Bauman: The Viability of Veil
Piercing to Hale Foreign Parent Corporations into U.S. Courts," University of Dayton Law Review: Vol. 41:
No. 2, Article 2.
Available at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol41/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at eCommons. It has been accepted
for inclusion in University of Dayton Law Review by an authorized editor of eCommons. For more information,
please contact mschlangen1@udayton.edu, ecommons@udayton.edu.

International Human Rights Litigation after Bauman: The Viability of Veil Piercing
to Hale Foreign Parent Corporations into U.S. Courts
Cover Page Footnote
Special thanks to my wife, Brittany, for her constant support and encouragement. Thanks to Anthony
Colangelo and Bryan Clegg for their helpful comments and criticism. All errors are mine.

This article is available in University of Dayton Law Review: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol41/iss2/2

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LITIGATION AFTER BAUMAN: THE VIABILITY
OF VEIL PIERCING TO HALE FOREIGN PARENT
CORPORATIONS INTO U.S. COURTS
Christopher R. Knight*
I. INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................214
II. BACKGROUND: INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION AND
VEIL PIERCING ................................................................................217
A. International Human Rights Litigation ......................................217
1. The ATS ...............................................................................218
2. General Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations: Doctrinal
History .................................................................................222
3. Current Law for International Human Rights Plaintiffs .......230
B. Veil-Piercing Law .......................................................................232
1. Traditional Veil Piercing ......................................................233
2. Jurisdictional Veil Piercing ..................................................238

a. The Cannon Doctrine and Traditional Piercing for
Jurisdiction .............................................................. 238
b. International Shoe Applied and Due Process
Analysis .................................................................. 242
c. Summary.................................................................. 244

III. VEIL PIERCING AS A MEANS TO HALE FOREIGN CORPORATIONS INTO
U.S. COURTS ...................................................................................244
A. Does Veil Piercing Make Sense in Human Rights Claims?........245
B. How Should Litigants Argue?.....................................................249
1. Policy and Purpose ...............................................................250
2. Legislative Policies Standard: Relief for Human Rights
Victims.................................................................................251
3. Single-Factor Piercing ..........................................................255
4. Cannon Need Not Apply ......................................................256
5. To Satisfy Due Process .........................................................256
6. Not Always a “Pro-Jurisdiction Answer” .............................257
7. Cart Before the Horse? .........................................................258
IV. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................259

*
J.D., SMU Dedman School of Law, 2015; B.B.A., Abilene Christian University, 2012. Law Clerk,
U.S. Court of Appeals. Special thanks to my wife, Brittany, for her constant support and encouragement.
Thanks to Anthony Colangelo and Bryan Clegg for their helpful comments and criticism. All errors are
mine.

Published by eCommons, 2016

214

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:2

I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence erects significant hurdles
for international human rights plaintiffs looking to sue foreign multinational
corporations in U.S. courts for human rights violations committed abroad.
The first hurdle makes bringing suit more difficult for such plaintiffs by
limiting the subject-matter jurisdiction of federal courts. Until 2013, plaintiffs
could bring international human rights claims under the Alien Tort Statute
(“ATS”) and obtain relief for human rights violations in federal court.1 In
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., however, the Court held that the
presumption against extraterritoriality—a “canon provid[ing] that ‘[w]hen a
statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has
none’”—applied to limit the reach of claims authorized under the ATS.2
Kiobel’s application of the presumption to the ATS severely limits suits by
foreign plaintiffs against foreign defendants for foreign conduct (referred to
as “foreign-cubed” or “f-cubed”).3 But the Kiobel Court did not slam the door
on such claims completely: a foreign plaintiff could still maintain a claim
under the ATS in federal court if it could displace the presumption by showing
its claim was sufficiently domestic.4
The second hurdle dealt with personal jurisdiction. Building on
another recent holding in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,
the Court in Daimler AG v. Bauman curtailed the jurisdictional reach of U.S.
courts by holding that general jurisdiction over a foreign parent corporation
exists only when that parent’s contacts “render [it] essentially at home in the
forum State.”5 In Bauman, the Court held that due process did not permit the
exercise of general jurisdiction over a parent foreign corporation in California
when the corporation—through its foreign subsidiary—allegedly committed
human rights violations abroad, despite the fact that the parent wholly owned
and controlled its U.S. subsidiary, which the Court presumed to be “at home”
in California.6 After Bauman, a foreign corporation (i.e., one not incorporated
in the United States) with only a small percentage of its actual business in any
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 248
(2010)). It is not completely clear whether Kiobel’s presumption limits subject-matter or prescriptive
jurisdiction, but most courts have treated it as a limit on subject-matter jurisdiction. See Anthony J.
Colangelo & Christopher R. Knight, Post-Kiobel Procedure: Subject Matter Jurisdiction or Prescriptive
Jurisdiction?, 19 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOR. AFF. 49, 55 (2015) (discussing lower court treatment).
3
See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 172 (2d Cir. 2008).
4
See, e.g., Ralph G. Steinhardt, Determining Which Human Rights Claims “Touch and Concern” the
United States: Justice Kennedy’s Filartiga, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1695, 1703 (2014); see also Bryan
M. Clegg, After Kiobel: An “Essential Step” to Displacing the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 67
SMU L. REV. 373, 375 (2014). Moreover, as I will discuss in Section II.A, state court adjudication also
seemed to be a promising avenue. See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, The Future of Human Rights Litigation After
Kiobel, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1749, 1749–50 (2014) (“[O]ne could say that the future of human rights
litigation in the United States depends on refashioning human rights claims as state or foreign tort
violations.”).
5
134 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2014) (citing 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011)).
6
Id. at 760.
1
2
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given state and with no U.S. headquarters might be jurisdictionally homeless
in the United States for acts committed abroad. In other words, after Bauman,
many large, foreign corporations cannot be haled into court absent specific
jurisdiction—a tall and maybe insurmountable feat for a plaintiff in an fcubed case (or even for a U.S. plaintiff suing a foreign corporation for human
rights violations committed abroad). This is so regardless of whether the
corporation has systematic and continuous contacts with the United States via
its U.S. subsidiary.7
In light of Bauman and Kiobel, therefore, international human rights
plaintiffs appear to have limited options when it comes to suing foreign
entities that are part of multinational corporations. The problem for these
plaintiffs is that both jurisdictional hands are tied: the subject-matter
jurisdiction hand is tied by the difficultly in overcoming the presumption
against extraterritoriality and the personal jurisdiction hand is tied by the
curtailment of general jurisdiction that culminated with Bauman. Although
the subject-matter jurisdiction hand is not the explicit focus of this Article, it
is an important piece to understanding what human rights plaintiffs are facing
and the nature of their now-limited options for relief. I discuss it to help paint
the broader landscape in international human rights claims against
corporations, but I do not, as others have, discuss how plaintiffs might
overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality.8
Instead, I will focus on untangling the personal jurisdiction knot tied
in Bauman, and specifically will ask whether veil piercing is a potential option
for human rights plaintiffs. While rejecting the plaintiffs’ claim that the
parent was subject to the same jurisdiction as the subsidiary under an agency
theory, the Bauman Court refused to address whether the parent could be
haled into court under other veil-piercing theories.9 Because jurisdictional
veil piercing could alleviate Bauman’s apparent immunization of
multinational corporate human rights offenders, this Article seeks to examine
that option and determine its viability, as well as consider how, in practice,
plaintiffs and courts might potentially use it.
As I discuss in-depth in Section II.B, the principle policy of veil7
Id. at 763 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting in Bauman, for example, the Court held that although
Daimler AG derived significant income (billions of dollars) from its California operations, it was not
subject to general jurisdiction there because those operations were under the umbrella of Mercedes-Benz
USA, a wholly-owned and controlled yet legally independent subsidiary).
8
See supra note 2 and accompanying text. I will note that until and unless Congress enacts a more
specific statute to apply to human rights violations by foreign corporations abroad, Kiobel—on its own—
will limit or preclude claims in federal court in f-cubed cases. Thus, even once personal jurisdiction is
established over a foreign corporation, litigants seeking to pursue ATS claims must show that the
presumption against extraterritoriality has been overcome. Notably, as Kiobel limits federal court
jurisdiction pursuant to the ATS, it will not act to limit human rights cases brought in state court.
9
Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 758; Donald Earl Childress III, General Jurisdiction After Bauman, 66 VAND.
L. REV. EN BANC 197, 201 (2014) (“[T]he Court declined to answer whether imputation of contacts is
viable for establishing general personal jurisdiction.”). This was the second time the Court had refused to
address such a theory in recent memory, as it also did so in Goodyear. 131 S. Ct. 2846.
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piercing law is to prevent injustice by way of the corporate form. And there
is a strong policy in federal international human rights law to allow for
recovery by human rights victims. In light of these policies, I conclude that
it is (at least arguably) reasonable to pierce the veil when the foreign parent
(assuming a U.S. subsidiary) would otherwise avoid amenability to U.S.
courts and, therefore, liability for human rights violations. After also
considering existing veil-piercing jurisprudence, I further conclude that
federal courts might reasonably pierce the corporate veil in international
human rights cases, even absent the traditional indicia of piercing, by using
either the Court’s federal interest piercing jurisprudence or single-factor
piercing tests.10 Although I also caution that the fit within the existing
piercing jurisprudence is not perfect, I suggest that litigants seeking to pierce
the veil when some of the more traditional indicia of piercing are absent do
have some viable arguments within existing veil-piercing law.
Aside from fit, there are a few concerns with using alleged human
rights violations as a reason to pierce the veil between a foreign parent and its
U.S. subsidiary so as to obtain jurisdiction over the foreign parent.11 First,
one could argue, using the allegations of human rights violations to
jurisdictionally pierce puts the cart before the horse; that is, if a court lets a
plaintiff jurisdictionally pierce because doing so prevents injustice or serves
federal policy of providing relief for victims of human rights violations, isn’t
the court determining—before any discovery—that the foreign parent is
guilty of human rights violations? Second, the Court in Bauman rejected the
Ninth Circuit’s agency analysis because, the Court noted, it “stacks the deck,
for it will always yield a pro-jurisdiction answer . . . .”12 Thus, any test that
nearly always yields a pro-jurisdiction answer is probably not viable. Finally,
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Cannon, discussed below, arguably controls
in jurisdictional veil-piercing cases.13 If that is the case, then piercing due to
alleged human rights violations is likely not a viable option.
As to the first concern, federal courts already have a standard to use
in deciding personal jurisdiction that does not decide substantive issues before
trial. This standard only requires the plaintiff—the party asserting
jurisdiction—to make a “prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts to
withstand the [defendant’s] motion to dismiss.”14 This low bar, which is
considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, ensures that there is no
cart-before-the-horse problem. As to the second concern, piercing due to
alleged human rights violations does not seem to be the type of analysis the
Bauman Court condemned. Unlike the Ninth Circuit’s agency analysis,
See infra Part III (noting that the latter option is far less promising for plaintiffs).
See infra Part III (discussing these concerns and solutions more in-depth).
12
Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 759.
13
See infra Section II.B.
14
Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495,
1498 (9th Cir. 1995)).
10
11
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piercing to stop corporations from skirting human rights liability would not
“stack the deck.” It would—like a number of well-accepted standards of
piercing—only yield a pro-jurisdiction answer under a narrow set of
circumstances—namely, when a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case that a
multinational corporation committed human rights violations abroad. As to
the final concern, most courts (in light of more recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence) have rejected a strict interpretation of Cannon and would not
interpret it to bar the use of a veil-piercing standard using alleged human
rights violations as a reason to pierce. In other words, Cannon can most likely
be avoided.
This Article will proceed in two main Parts: the first (Part II)
describes the background and problem; the second (Part III) explores whether
veil piercing might be a potential solution. Part II thus describes the legal
background against which international human rights plaintiffs find
themselves when looking to hale a foreign corporation into U.S. court by
piercing its veil. I first look at the background for international human rights
claims in U.S. courts, specifically examining the jurisprudence involving
claims brought under the ATS in federal courts. Then I consider the Supreme
Court’s general jurisdiction caselaw, culminating in Goodyear and Bauman.
I also extensively consider veil-piercing law as it relates to both substantive
liability and jurisdiction. Part III looks to whether piercing is a viable option
for international human rights plaintiffs. I conclude that piercing a U.S.
subsidiary’s veil to hale a foreign parent into court when the parent has
committed human rights violations abroad (particularly when the plaintiff has
a viable claim against the parent arising under the ATS) works reasonably
well within the context of existing veil-piercing law, and that it makes sense
in light of the policies of both veil piercing and international human rights.
II. BACKGROUND: INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LITIGATION AND VEIL PIERCING
A. International Human Rights Litigation
In the last half-century, human rights litigation in the United States
has undergone significant changes. For thirty-three years, droves of foreign
plaintiffs sought relief for international human rights violations in U.S. courts
by way of the ATS.15 But in 2013, the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. applied the presumption against extraterritoriality
to claims arising under the ATS, curtailing its use and thus making
international human rights claims in U.S. courts generally more difficult
(although not impossible) to pursue.16 Less than a year later, the Supreme
15
16

Clegg, supra note 4, at 378.
133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
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Court in Daimler AG v. Bauman seemingly closed the door on such claims
completely—at least those asserted against foreign corporations—by holding
no general jurisdiction existed over a foreign parent corporation based on its
U.S. subsidiary’s contacts, even if the subsidiary was amenable to general
jurisdiction in a U.S. court.17 In an effort to paint the background against
which international human rights plaintiffs must now litigate their claims, this
Section discusses these recent developments.18
1. The ATS
Since at least 1980, the ATS has been a prolific vehicle for
international human rights plaintiffs’ claims in federal courts.19 The ATS was
passed by the first Congress as part of the Judiciary Act of 178920 and
originally provided that “new federal district courts ‘shall also have
cognizance[] . . . of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.’”21 After a few slight
modifications,22 it now reads in full: “The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”23
Despite its early origins, the ATS was practically obscure from 1789
to 1980.24 That changed, however, when the Second Circuit decided Filartiga
v. Pena-Irala.25 Filartiga involved a claim by a Paraguayan citizen in federal
district court against a former Paraguayan police official for conduct abroad,
in which the plaintiff alleged that the official tortured and killed the plaintiff’s
17-year-old son.26 The district court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction, but the Second Circuit reversed, holding that
torture was unambiguously and universally condemned by international law
and therefore that the suit was authorized under the ATS—it was an action
“by an alien, for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations.”27
Filartiga “paved the way for international human rights litigation in
U.S. courts.”28 Initially, these Filartiga-based ATS claims involved mostly
134 S. Ct. at 760–61.
This Article will focus on federal court adjudication of international human rights claims. However,
although veil piercing and personal jurisdiction might differ in some respects between state and federal
courts, the basic analysis and issues wrestled with in this Article would likely hold true in both.
19
Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 587, 589 (2002).
20
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663.
21
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712–13 (2004) (quoting Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat.
77 (1789)).
22
Id. at 713 n.10.
23
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
24
See IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975); Bradley, supra note 19, at 588 (“Before
1980, jurisdiction had been upheld under [the ATS] in only two reported cases, one in 1795 and the other
in 1961.”).
25
630 F.2d 876, 884–86 (2d Cir. 1980).
26
Id. at 878.
27
Id. at 887.
28
Bradley, supra note 19, at 589.
17
18
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foreign plaintiffs suing officials or their home governments for human rights
violations abroad.29 But in 1995, in Kadic v. Karadzic, the Second Circuit
held “that the law of nations, as understood in the modern era, [did not]
confine[] its reach to state action.”30 And in 1997, the Central District of
California, later affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, held that the ATS provided
jurisdiction over torture and slavery claims against a multinational
corporation.31 These cases, among others, ushered in a new generation of
ATS jurisprudence that allowed claims against multinational corporations,32
especially “when the tortious activities violate norms of ‘universal concern’
that are recognized to extend to the conduct of private parties––for example,
slavery, genocide, and war crimes.”33
In 2004, in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court weighed in
on the ATS for the first time, clarifying that the ATS was a jurisdictional grant
and limiting the causes of action authorized under it to “a relatively modest
set of actions alleging violations of the law of nations.”34 To define the limits
of such violations, the Court referred to three 18th century paradigms:
“violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and
piracy.”35 The Court thus imposed a requirement that “any claim based on
the present-day law of nations [must] rest on a norm of international character
accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to
the features of the 18th-century paradigms [the Court] recognized.”36
Yet, although Sosa gave some substance to the scope of the ATS’s
jurisdictional grant, it left important questions unresolved. Among them was
whether corporations were liable under the ATS, or as the Sosa Court
recognized, “whether international law extends the scope of liability for a
violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a
private actor such as a corporation or individual.”37 As courts continued to
find corporate liability under the ATS after Sosa,38 the Court was soon
presented with this question in Kiobel. In Kiobel, Nigerian nationals had sued
29
Gregory H. Fox & Yunjoo Goze, International Human Rights Litigation After Kiobel, 92 MICH.
B.J. 44, 44–45 (2013).
30
70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995).
31
Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 892 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d in part sub nom. John Doe I v.
Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 944–46 (9th Cir. 2002).
32
See Fox & Goze, supra note 29, at 44–45; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 71 (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“Individuals may be held liable for offenses
against international law, such as piracy, war crimes, or genocide. Corporations frequently are vehicles
through which rights under international economic law are asserted.”).
33
Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 173 (2d Cir. 2009).
34
542 U.S. 692, 720 (2004).
35
Id. at 724.
36
Id. at 725; see also Hilao v. Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos), 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)
(“Actionable violations of international law must be of a norm that is specific, universal, and obligatory.”).
37
542 U.S. at 732 n.20.
38
See Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 169; see also Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 260–
64 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding ATS conferred jurisdiction over multinational corporations purportedly
collaborating with South African government).
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British and Dutch corporations under the ATS, “alleging that the corporations
aided and abetted the Nigerian Government in committing violations of the
law of nations in Nigeria.”39 The Second Circuit, noting that its decisions in
the past had “decided ATS cases involving corporations without addressing
the issue of corporate liability,” concluded “that the customary international
law of human rights has not to date recognized liability for corporations that
violate its norms.”40 It thus dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims against the
corporations for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.41 Other circuits, however,
quickly and explicitly disagreed with the Second Circuit’s conclusion.42
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of corporate
liability. A week after oral argument, however, the Court directed the parties
to file supplemental briefs discussing the question on which it ultimately
decided the case: “Whether and under what circumstances the [ATS] allows
courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations
occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States.”43
In addressing this question, the Court held that the presumption against
extraterritoriality, which provides that “[w]hen a statute gives no clear
indication of extraterritorial application, it has none,” applied to the ATS.44
The Court then considered whether anything in the text, history, or purposes
of the ATS evidenced a clear intent that it should apply extraterritorially. 45
Finding no clear intent, the Court held that as “nothing in the statute rebuts
that presumption,” plaintiffs’ “case seeking relief for violations of the law of
nations occurring outside the United States [was] barred.”46
However, the Court did not completely close the door on claims
brought using the ATS. After finding the claims were barred under the facts
of Kiobel, where “all the relevant conduct took place outside the United
States,” the Court observed that “claims [that] touch and concern the territory
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662 (2013).
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 124–25 (2d Cir. 2010).
Id. at 149–50 (Leval, J., concurring) (noting that the effect of the majority’s rule is that “one who
earns profits by commercial exploitation of abuse of fundamental human rights can successfully shield
those profits from victims’ claims for compensation simply by taking the precaution of conducting the
heinous operation in the corporate form”).
42
See Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“Our conclusion differs from that
of the Second Circuit . . . because its analysis conflates the norms of conduct at issue in Sosa and the rules
for any remedy to be found in federal common law at issue here.” (internal citations omitted)); Flomo v.
Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding corporate liability under the ATS
and noting that “[a]ll but one of the cases at our level hold or assume (mainly the latter) that corporations
can be liable”); Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 174 (assuming corporations can be liable); Romero v. Drummond
Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding corporations can be liable); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC,
550 F.3d 822, 831 (9th Cir. 2008); Herero People’s Reparations Corp. v. Deutsche Bank, 370 F.3d 1192,
1195 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (assuming corporations can be liable); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226
F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 2000) (assuming corporations can be liable); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197
F.3d 161, 164–65 (5th Cir. 1999) (assuming corporations can be liable).
43
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012) (internal citation omitted).
44
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664 (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010)).
45
Id. at 1664–69.
46
Id. at 1669.
39
40
41
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of the United States . . . with sufficient force [may nonetheless] displace the
presumption . . . .”47 While it provided no analysis as to what “sufficient
force” may be, it did note that “it would reach too far to say that mere
corporate presence suffices.”48
For better or worse, Kiobel seriously limits the ATS as an avenue for
foreign plaintiffs to pursue international human rights litigation, especially
against foreign defendants (including corporations) for foreign conduct. The
Kiobel presumption apparently limits federal court subject-matter
jurisdiction, which means that human rights plaintiffs in federal court will
likely have a more difficult time getting to the merits of their claims, even if
the defendants somehow fail to argue that Kiobel applies.49 While a handful
of lower courts have applied Kiobel’s presumption and found it to be
displaced, they have done so only upon finding there to be some significant
domestic elements in the claim.50 So although the ATS remains a potential
vehicle for foreign human rights plaintiffs, Kiobel indicates that it no longer
a ready one.51
Still, there might be “a surprising number of [other] options available
under federal, state, and foreign law.”52 Most important among these options,
commentators have observed, seems to be state tort law, as “[t]he same facts
that give rise to international human rights violations almost always will also
constitute a domestic or foreign tort.”53 And since state courts are of general
jurisdiction, they can adjudicate claims resting on state or foreign tort laws.
Indeed, prior to Kiobel, U.S. plaintiffs (who were not “aliens” and thus could
not sue under the ATS) successfully sued in state court for human rights
violations.54 Choice-of-law principles would then determine whether foreign
Id.
Id.
49
Colangelo & Knight, supra note 2, at 8–9.
50
E.g., Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 529 (4th Cir. 2014); Sexual Minorities
Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 310 (D. Mass. 2013).
51
See Gwynne L. Skinner, Beyond Kiobel: Providing Access to Judicial Remedies for Violations of
International Human Rights Norms by Transnational Business in a New (Post-Kiobel) World, 46 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 158, 198 (2014) (“Human rights litigation practitioners agree that Kiobel presents a
barrier to those seeking access to judicial remedies for businesses’ involvement in human rights abuses
outside the United States. However, not all practitioners agree as to how easily the presumption can be
overcome.”).
52
Alford, supra note 4, at 1749. Some more obvious alternatives, however, such as the Torture Victim
Protection Act (“TVPA”) and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), suffer from
serious shortcomings. See Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1708 (2012) (holding TVPA
does not apply to corporations or governments); see also RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct.
2090, 2095, 2098–99, 2106 (2016) (holding RICO’s private right of action “does not overcome the
presumption against extraterritoriality” and that “[a] private RICO plaintiff therefore must allege and prove
a domestic injury to its business or property” (emphasis in original)).
53
See Alford, supra note 4, at 1761; Skinner, supra note 51, at 163; and Paul Hoffman & Beth
Stephens, International Human Rights Cases Under State Law and in State Courts, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV.
9, 11 (2013), for a thoughtful and more in-depth discussions on the options available to human rights
plaintiffs after Kiobel.
54
See Hoffman & Stephens, supra note 53, at 13–15 (discussing a number of state court human rights
claims).
47
48
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or state law applies; for human rights plaintiffs, either outcome would usually
be acceptable. If state law applies, plaintiffs can bring human rights claims
as common-law torts—torture as assault and battery, slavery as false
imprisonment, etc. Even if foreign law applies, plaintiffs can bring
international human rights claims in state courts as violations of international
law, which “has been incorporated into the law of most countries around the
world.”55
In sum, after Kiobel, although foreign human rights plaintiffs lost a
ready vehicle for their claims in the ATS, they were not without recourse
against foreign corporations56 in U.S. courts.57 They could still bring claims
in federal courts by displacing the presumption against extraterritoriality.
And they could still bring claims in state courts.58 This was the backdrop
against which plaintiffs found themselves prior to Daimler AG v. Bauman,
which limited the ability of U.S. courts to reach foreign defendants under the
Due Process Clause.59 To understand Bauman (and the analysis in Part III,
below), however, it is helpful to understand some of the history and evolution
of personal jurisdiction, especially as it relates to general jurisdiction.
2. General Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations: Doctrinal History
The Supreme Court’s journey to define the contours of personal
jurisdiction law has been a long and arduous one.60 Prior to the mid-20th
century, courts viewed jurisdictional issues through a formalist lens, focusing
primarily on a state’s power over a defendant via presence, property, or

55
See Alford, supra note 4, at 1750. However, there might be unforeseen barriers to recovery in
foreign law, even if it recognizes a cause of action for violations of international human rights. See, e.g.,
Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 2d 857, 871–72 (E.D. Va. 2013), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 758 F.3d 516, 520 (4th Cir. 2014) (applying Iraqi law and finding the defendant, a U.S.
corporation that had contracts with the United States, immune from suit).
56
Foreign plaintiffs suing U.S. corporations can probably still bring suit in federal court because they
can use diversity jurisdiction rather than the ATS to obtain jurisdiction, using Sosa’s federal common-law
claims, and will generally be able to obtain general jurisdiction over the corporation. See Alford, supra
note 4, at 1768.
57
Although most courts recognize corporate liability for international human rights claims, the debate
of whether international law recognizes such claims is not a completely settled question. Compare Kiobel
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 124–25 (2d Cir. 2010) (no), with Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti
Bank, 692 F.3d 661, 683–84 (7th Cir. 2012) (yes), and Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 747 (9th
Cir. 2011) (yes), and Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (yes), and Sinaltrainal
v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1263 (11th Cir. 2009) (yes). This Article will not attempt to resolve this
dispute. Instead, I will assume human rights claims against corporations are viable.
58
Although this Article will primarily address federal court adjudication, much of the veil piercing
principles applied in federal court would equally apply in state court.
59
See generally 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
60
To exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, a court asks two questions: (1)
whether the state’s long-arm statute reaches the defendant; and, if so, (2) whether the exercise of
jurisdiction is constitutionally permissible. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 463–
64 (1985). For the sake of simplicity, and because many state long-arm statutes extend jurisdiction to the
full extent permitted by the Constitution, see, Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 754, I will assume in this Article that
the two questions have coalesced into one: whether the exercise of jurisdiction is permitted by the Due
Process Clause.
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consent.61 Accordingly, shortly after the enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court set its course by constitutionalizing personal
jurisdiction in the landmark case of Pennoyer v. Neff, which exemplified a
power-based jurisdictional approach by holding that assertions of jurisdiction
by courts lacking legitimate authority over defendants violated the Due
Process Clause.62 The Court in Pennoyer held that “no State can exercise
direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory”
and that “no tribunal established by [a State] can extend its process beyond
that territory so as to subject either persons or property to its decisions.”63
This power-based approach, with its focus on the territorial limitations of the
forum state, worked out relatively well for a time as “business affairs were
predominately local in nature and travel between States was difficult, costly
and sometimes even dangerous.”64 But times changed: the corporate form
proliferated and commerce began to flow more and more often between states
and countries. These developments rendered the formal, power-based
approach of Pennoyer insufficient.65
To adapt to these changes, specifically as they related to corporations,
courts developed “doing business” tests, which generally held that
corporations were “present” and thus amenable to jurisdiction in any state in
which they were doing business.66 Courts (including the Supreme Court)
applied this test broadly, subjecting foreign and out-of-state corporations to
their jurisdiction when those corporations maintained an office or conducted
a certain level of business within the state.67 In 1945, however, the Court
decided a change in the jurisdictional framework was needed and accordingly
adjusted the jurisdictional analysis, while arguably retaining the essence of
“doing business” and general jurisdiction. In International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, the Court abandoned Pennoyer’s presence requirement and held
that for a court to exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, due
61
See Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, The Predictability Principle in Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine: A
Case Study on the Effects of a “Generally” Too Broad, but “Specifically” Too Narrow Approach to
Minimum Contacts, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 135, 143 (2005); see, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722
(1877) (“[E]very State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within
its territory.”); McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917) (“The foundation of jurisdiction is physical
power.”).
62
95 U.S. at 722–23, 733; see also Allan R. Stein, The Meaning of “Essentially at Home” in Goodyear
Dunlop, 63 S.C. L. REV. 527, 534 (2012). It is notable that Pennoyer was decided shortly after—less than
ten years—the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted.
63
95 U.S. at 722.
64
See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 260 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting).
65
See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 753–54 (2014) (quoting Burnham v. Superior Court,
495 U.S. 604, 617 (1990)) (“In time, however, [the] strict territorial approach [of Pennoyer] yielded to a
less rigid understanding, spurred by ‘changes in the technology of transportation and communication, and
the tremendous growth of interstate business activity.’”); see also Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court,
the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 585–86
(1958).
66
See, e.g., Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915, 918 (N.Y. 1917) (“We hold, then, that the
defendant corporation is engaged in business within this state[] . . . [and] jurisdiction does not fail because
the cause of action sued upon has no relation in its origin to the business here transacted.”).
67
E.g., Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 108 (1898).
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process requires the defendant to “have certain minimum contacts with [a
forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”68 The Court there dealt with
specific jurisdiction,69 where the suit “aris[es] out of or relate[s] to the
defendant’s contacts with the forum.”70 But it also touched on general
jurisdiction over corporations, which it noted could exist in “instances in
which the continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so
substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action
arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.”71 This, in part,
reflected the “doing business” jurisprudence that had developed in the wake
of Pennoyer.
Therefore, although International Shoe shifted the focus of personal
jurisdiction law to “fair play and substantial justice,” it did not go so far as to
discard presence, service, and territoriality as important themes when general
jurisdiction was in play.72 Jurisdiction could continue to be found if the
corporation or person was present within the state, either by way of
“domicile” for natural persons, or by way of headquarters or state of
incorporation for corporate entities.73 Moreover, service of process on a
person physically present within the forum state was sufficient to subject that
person to a forum court’s jurisdiction.74 And “doing business”—so long as
contacts were “continuous” and “substantial”—was still a basis for general
jurisdiction over corporations.75
Following International Shoe, even though the Court weighed in a
number of times over the next 70-or-so years as it related to specific
jurisdiction,76 it provided very little guidance on general jurisdiction or the
vitality and application of “doing business” jurisprudence.77 In Perkins v.
Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., the Court was confronted with whether a
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
See id.
70
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984).
71
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318; see also Meir Feder, Goodyear, “Home,” and the Uncertain Future of
Doing Business Jurisdiction, 63 S.C. L. REV. 671, 672 (2012) (“General jurisdiction is the branch of
personal jurisdiction that allows a forum state to assert judicial authority over ‘any and all claims’ against
a defendant that has a sufficiently close connection to the state - even claims arising from conduct
elsewhere that is completely unrelated to the state.”).
72
See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 617–19 (1990).
73
See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853–54 (2011).
74
E.g., Burnham, 495 U.S. at 619 (“[J]urisdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes due
process because it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal system that define the due process standard
of ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”). It is unclear whether Burnham applies to
corporations as well. The Ninth Circuit, however, recently held that Burnham does not apply to
corporations, and thus service of process on corporate officers within the forum state does not subject the
corporation itself to jurisdiction. See Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 2014),
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2310 (2015).
75
See Feder, supra note 71, at 675.
76
See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 108–09 (1987); World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291–92 (1980); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251
(1958).
77
See Feder, supra note 71, at 675.
68
69
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company president’s maintenance of an office in Ohio during World War II—
from which he transacted company business, drew salary checks, maintained
company funds, oversaw company policy, and attended board meetings—
allowed an Ohio court to exercise general jurisdiction over the company.78
The Court held that it did: in light of the president’s “continuous and
systematic supervision of the necessarily limited wartime activities of the
company[,] . . . it would not violate federal due process” to exercise
jurisdiction over the company.79 However, “the defendant was basically
headquartered in [the forum], if only temporarily, so this was not a situation
in which the defendant was merely ‘doing business’ in the state,” and thus
Perkins shed little light on what contacts were necessary to establish general
jurisdiction or what constituted “doing business.”80 And although the Court’s
next general jurisdiction opinion in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia,
S.A. v. Hall81 considered whether a foreign corporation’s contacts—rather
than actual corporate presence—were sufficient to subject a corporation to
general jurisdiction, it likewise did fairly little to delineate the reach of the
doctrine.82 The Helicopteros Court held that the corporation’s contacts—
which included millions of dollars in purchases, training of personnel, and
contracts in the forum state—were insufficient to subject it to general
jurisdiction for an injury unrelated to and not arising out of those contacts.83
From Helicopteros one could correctly conclude that the “continuous
and systematic” contact threshold required for an exercise of general
jurisdiction was a demanding one, although the Court did not say what level
of contact was necessary to cross it. Dicta in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc., where the out-of-state defendant sold thousands of copies of its magazine
in the forum each month, lends further support to this conclusion.84 Although
it would seem that such sales would qualify as “continuous and systematic,”
the Court suggested otherwise:
In the instant case, respondent’s activities in the forum may
not be so substantial as to support jurisdiction over a cause
of action unrelated to those activities. But respondent is
carrying on a “part of its general business” in New
Hampshire, and that is sufficient to support jurisdiction when
the cause of action arises out of the very activity being

342 U.S. 437, 447–488 (1952).
Id.
80
See Mary Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing Business with Doing-Business Jurisdiction, U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 171, 184–85 (2001).
81
466 U.S. 408, 409 (1984).
82
See Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 612 (1988)
(“Regrettably, . . . the Court [in Helicopteros] gave no guidance as to how courts are to determine the scope
of general jurisdiction in the future.”).
83
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 411, 418–19.
84
465 U.S. 770, 781 (1984).
78
79
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conducted, in part, in New Hampshire.85
Thus, from International Shoe to the early 21st century, general jurisdiction
was somewhat of an enigma. The Court gave clues86 and bookends, but it did
not clearly demonstrate when and how “continuous and systematic” contacts
with the forum state would render that state’s exercise of jurisdiction over the
defendant “reasonable” in light of “traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.”87 Indeed, scholars surmised that the Court’s precedents
might have even suggested “something greater than continuous and
systematic contacts [was] required for doing-business jurisdiction––perhaps
a place of business, or even a principal place of business.”88 They were
correct.
In 2011, the Court finally weighed in again. In Goodyear Dunlop
Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, two North Carolina boys were killed in a bus
accident in France.89 Their parents brought a product-defect suit against a
U.S. tire manufacturer and its European subsidiaries, none of which
conducted business in North Carolina, aside from a small percentage of their
tires reaching the state.90 In considering the claim, a unanimous Court first
announced a seemingly far-reaching modification to the amorphous
“continuous and systematic” standard: “A court may assert general
jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to hear
any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so
‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum
State.”91 Applying this new standard, the Court held with ease that “[a]
connection so limited between the forum and the foreign corporation . . . is an
inadequate basis for the exercise of general jurisdiction.”92 Notably, however,
the Court declined to address the plaintiffs’ jurisdictional veil-piercing
argument, which asked the Court “to consolidate [the foreign subsidiaries’]
ties to North Carolina with those of Goodyear USA” due to waiver.93
Goodyear’s “essentially at home” language had the potential to effect
a major change in the law—it could very much narrow the reach of general
jurisdiction as many lower courts and commentators understood it.94 Indeed,
Id. at 779–80 (emphasis added).
See id. (giving clues).
87
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414; Perkins v. Benguet Mining. Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447 (1952).
88
Twitchell, supra note 80, at 186.
89
131 S. Ct. 2846, 2850 (2011).
90
Id. at 2851–52.
91
Id. at 2851 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)).
92
Id.
93
Id. at 2857.
94
See, e.g., Lakin v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 348 F.3d 704, 706, 708 n.7 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding general
jurisdiction when the defendant had nearly $10 million, or 1%, of its loan portfolio with citizens of the
forum state); Mich. Nat’l Bank v. Quality Dinette, Inc., 888 F.2d 462, 465–67 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding
defendant subject to general jurisdiction in the forum state where 3% of its total sales were made);
Provident Nat’l Bank v. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 819 F.2d 434, 436–38 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that
$10 million in loans to the forum’s citizens, which amounted to 0.083% of the company’s total loan
85
86
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one commentator suggested that a broad reading was so implausible and farreaching that “[a] better reading of the case would be to focus on the particular
facts of Goodyear and limit its meaning to the conclusion that the stream-ofcommerce theory may not be utilized to establish general jurisdiction.”95
But Goodyear’s effect was not an open question for long. Three years
later in Daimler AG v. Bauman, the Court spoke yet again on general
jurisdiction and added some clarity to Goodyear’s “essentially at home”
standard.96 Bauman was an f-cubed case: it “concern[ed] the authority of a
court in the United States to entertain a claim brought by foreign plaintiffs
against a foreign defendant based on events occurring entirely outside the
United States.”97 The Court was asked to decide “whether it violates due
process for a court to exercise general personal jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation based solely on the fact that an indirect corporate subsidiary
performs services on behalf of the defendant in the forum State.”98 This
seemed to directly implicate the doctrine of veil piercing: “whether a
subsidiary’s contacts can be imputed to a parent corporation to establish
general personal jurisdiction.”99
The plaintiffs in Bauman were Argentinian residents who alleged that
Mercedes-Benz Argentina (“MB Argentina”) “collaborated with Argentinian
state security forces to kidnap, detain, torture, and kill plaintiffs and their
relatives during the military dictatorship in place there from 1976 through
1983, a period known as Argentina’s ‘Dirty War.’”100 They filed suit in
California, asserting claims under the ATS and Torture Victim Protection Act
(“TVPA”), as well as for common-law torts such as wrongful death.101 The
plaintiffs named only one corporation as a defendant: Daimler, a German
public stock company that manufactured Mercedes-Benz vehicles in
Germany, and which wholly owned and was the parent corporation of MB
Argentina and Mercedes-Benz USA (“MBUSA”).102
In the district court, the plaintiffs did not attempt to argue that the
court had specific jurisdiction over Daimler, nor did they challenge in the
Ninth Circuit the district court’s “holding that Daimler’s own contacts with
California were, by themselves, too sporadic to justify the exercise of
portfolio, in addition to other contacts, was enough to give rise to general jurisdiction); Lea Brilmayer et
al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721, 734 (1988) (“Place of incorporation,
however, is not the only affiliation that supports general jurisdiction; a corporation may do sufficient
business within a state to give the state general jurisdiction over it.”).
95
See Todd David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts After Goodyear and McIntyre, 80 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 202, 217 (2011).
96
134 S. Ct. 746, 761 (2014).
97
Id. at 750.
98
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (No. 11-965).
99
See Childress III, supra note 9, at 198.
100
134 S. Ct. at 751.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 752.
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jurisdiction.”103 In addition, “[w]hile plaintiffs ultimately persuaded the
Ninth Circuit to impute MBUSA’s California contacts to Daimler on an
agency theory, at no point [did] they maintain[] that MBUSA [was] an alter
ego of Daimler.”104 And given that Daimler had waived any argument that
MBUSA was not amenable to general jurisdiction in California, the Court
assumed MBUSA “qualifie[d] as at home in California.”105
The Court started its opinion by rebuking the Ninth Circuit’s agency
analysis, which asked “whether the subsidiary ‘performs services that are
sufficiently important to the foreign corporation that if it did not have a
representative to perform them, the corporation’s own officials would
undertake to perform substantially similar services.’”106 But the Court did not
go on to wholesale condemn agency or alter-ego tests for finding general
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation based on the contacts of an in-state
subsidiary, noting that several circuits have utilized the jurisdictional alterego analysis.107 It instead avoided that question altogether: “[W]e need not
pass judgment on invocation of an agency theory in the context of general
jurisdiction, for in no event can the appeals court’s analysis be sustained.”108
The Court said that the fatal flaw of the Ninth Circuit’s agency analysis was
that it merely focused on whether a subsidiary’s services were important to
the parent. Such an analysis, the Court said, “stacks the deck, for it will
always yield a pro-jurisdiction answer: ‘Anything a corporation does through
an independent contractor, subsidiary, or distributor is presumably something
that the corporation would do “by other means” if the independent contractor,
subsidiary, or distributor did not exist.’”109
Accordingly, the Court did not address the contact imputation
question that the case seemingly presented; instead, it assumed that MBUSA
was “at home” in California and that MBUSA’s contacts were imputable to
Daimler.110 These assumptions allowed the Court to reframe the issue as
“whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment precludes the
District Court from exercising jurisdiction over Daimler in this case, given
the absence of any California connection to the atrocities, perpetrators, or
victims described in the complaint.”111 It might have appeared, therefore,
given the Court’s assumptions and the “essentially at home” standard
announced in Goodyear, that Daimler—with MBUSA’s contacts imputed to
Id. at 758.
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 759 (quoting Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 928 (9th Cir. 2001)) (explaining that the
Ninth Circuit would find imputation appropriate if either this agency or the alter ego test were satisfied).
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id. (quoting Bauman v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 676 F.3d 774, 777 (9th Cir. 2011) (O’Scannlain,
J., dissenting)).
110
Id. at 760.
111
Id. at 751.
103
104
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it—was also “essentially at home” so as to be subject to general jurisdiction
in California.112
But the Court didn’t see it that way. Even if MBUSA’s contacts in
California rendered it at home, the Court said, those same contacts imputed
to Daimler were insufficient because as “[a] corporation that operates in many
places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them,” general jurisdiction
“calls for an appraisal of a corporation’s activities in their entirety, nationwide
and worldwide.”113 Reiterating Goodyear’s “essentially at home” standard,
the Court held that Daimler’s MBUSA California contacts, proportionally
considered, comprised only a small percentage of its worldwide activities and
operations; thus, those contacts could not render Daimler at home in
California.114
Following Goodyear and Bauman it is clear that the bar for general
jurisdiction, especially over foreign corporations, is high: plaintiffs hoping to
hale foreign corporations into court must show that the foreign corporation—
not its U.S. subsidiary, if any—is “essentially at home” in the forum state.115
Given the Bauman Court’s proportionality approach, this means that contacts
sufficient to make a subsidiary at home, even if imputed from the in-state
subsidiary to the foreign parent, may not be sufficient to subject that parent to
general jurisdiction. With this, the Court also “appears to be calling into
doubt whether a subsidiary’s contacts can ever be imputed to establish general
jurisdiction,” although it did not definitively decide as much.116 Yet, it is also
possible that in refusing to comment on general veil-piercing law, the Court
is leaving states free to develop substantive agency and alter-ego law, which
they remain free to use in jurisdictional analyses, so long as such use comports
with constitutional limits on the state’s exercise of personal jurisdiction. 117
And to deem a corporation, especially a large one, “at home,” Bauman
See Childress III, supra note 9, at 201–02.
Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20.
Id. at 760–62. Justice Sotomayor concurred in the Court’s result but took issue with its chosen
rationale. Id. First, she disagreed with the Court’s reliance on viewing Daimler’s California contacts “in
the context of its extensive ‘nationwide and worldwide’ operations” (the “proportionality approach”),
which she argued was the Court deeming “Daimler ‘too big for general jurisdiction.’” Id. at 764
(Sotomayor, J., concurring). She would have instead found Daimler to be at home, but used the
reasonableness prong of personal jurisprudence to refuse to exercise jurisdiction. Id.
115
See id. at 761 (majority opinion); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct.
2846, 2851 (2011).
116
Childress III, supra note 9, at 199.
117
See infra Section II.B.2; see also Lea Brilmayer & Kathleen Paisley, Personal Jurisdiction and
Substantive Legal Relations: Corporations, Conspiracies, and Agency, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1, 27 (1986) (“This
is a common pattern in situations where the federal Constitution protects rights originally defined by state
law.”). As Brilmayer and Paisley note, another option would “involve developing a body of federal
constitutional law defining the nexus that parties must have before the substantive legal relationship obtains
jurisdictional significance.” Id. at 28; see Jennifer A. Schwartz, Comment, Piercing the Corporate Veil of
an Alien Parent for Jurisdictional Purposes: A Proposal for a Standard that Comports with Due Process,
96 CAL. L. REV. 731 (2008) (advocating the development of defining the jurisdictional veil piercing
standard to be in line with the Supreme Court’s constitutional due process standard for personal
jurisdiction).
112
113
114
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strongly suggests that only very strong contacts—such as state of
incorporation or headquarters—will suffice.118
In her Bauman concurrence, Justice Sotomayor noted further
potential consequences of the Court’s chosen rationale. The Court’s
proportionality approach, she said, “will treat small businesses unfairly in
comparison to national and multinational conglomerates. Whereas a larger
company will often be immunized from general jurisdiction in a State on
account of its extensive contacts outside the forum, a small business will not
be.”119 Moreover, she argued that the decision creates an incongruous result
in which individual defendants will be subject to general jurisdiction in a state
for one visit under Burnham, but a multinational corporation doing billions of
dollars of business in that same state will not solely due to its operations
elsewhere.120 This concern, it should be noted, is now especially salient given
the Ninth Circuit’s recent holding that Burnham’s “tag” jurisdiction does not
apply to corporations.121
Finally, and most importantly for plaintiffs looking to sue for
international human rights violations, Justice Sotomayor predicted that “the
ultimate effect of the majority’s approach will be to shift the risk of loss from
multinational corporations to individuals harmed by their actions.”122 In other
words, a plaintiff who is injured by a foreign, rather than domestic,
corporation may be unable to recover in any U.S. jurisdiction even if that
company does considerable business and has subsidiaries in various U.S.
forums. Justice Sotomayor’s first concern is also important here because, like
U.S. corporations, smaller businesses may not have the scale to avoid
jurisdiction under the proportionality approach; thus, a plaintiff’s chance at
recovery will vary greatly depending on the bad actor’s wealth and scope,
with wealthy multinational corporations with broad, worldwide operations
benefitting. Beyond Justice Sotomayor’s concerns, it appears that the
Bauman proportionality approach also has the potential to shift the loss to
U.S. corporations. If a U.S. corporation harms a plaintiff abroad, that plaintiff
can unquestionably hale the corporation into some U.S. court. But under
Bauman, if that same plaintiff under the same facts sues a foreign
corporation—even one with extensive U.S. business operations and
subsidiaries—establishing personal jurisdiction seems extremely difficult.
3. Current Law for International Human Rights Plaintiffs
In light of the Court’s recent restriction of both general (Bauman) and
See Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 760–62.
Id. at 772 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
120
Id. at 772–73.
121
See Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1071 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2310
(2015).
122
Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 773 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
118
119

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol41/iss2/2

2016]

HUMAN RIGHTS VEIL PIERCING

231

subject-matter (Kiobel) jurisdiction, what legitimate relief can foreign human
rights plaintiffs obtain in U.S. courts? One difficulty is that “[c]ivil human
rights litigation generally continues to be viewed as a peculiarly U.S.
phenomenon,”123 and thus the U.S. may be the only realistic option for many
foreign plaintiffs.124 For its part, Kiobel left an opening for plaintiffs by noting
that the presumption could be overcome by claims that were sufficiently
domestic,125 and plaintiffs still had options in state court.126 And, of course,
human rights groups could argue for legislation specifically applying to
international human rights violations committed by corporations, which
would presumably overcome the Kiobel barrier.
Before Goodyear and Bauman, general jurisdiction’s looser
formulation “permit[ted] U.S. courts to assert jurisdiction more widely than .
. . many [other legal] systems” due to the rule providing “general jurisdiction
over . . . corporations that have minimum contacts with the jurisdiction.”127
This formulation made the United States a favorable forum in which plaintiffs
could bring Filartiga-type claims under the ATS.128 But Bauman obviously
limited the options for haling foreign corporations into court by way of
general jurisdiction by imposing the requirement that the corporation be
“essentially at home.”129 And although the Bauman Court did not completely
discard agency theory,130 it significantly limited any potential usefulness of
the doctrine by requiring that the imputed contacts be proportionally
considered in determining whether they render a foreign parent at home.
Importantly, because its standard is constitutional in nature and limits the
ability of all courts to reach foreign defendants, Bauman arguably creates a
more significant hurdle for human rights plaintiffs than Kiobel.
Indeed, Gwynne Skinner predicts Bauman “will have significant
repercussions for victims who have been harmed by businesses that engage
in substantial activity in the United States but are headquartered elsewhere—
perhaps in a country that is not a sufficient forum or makes it otherwise
difficult to bring civil cases.”131 Bauman, in combination with the complexity
of corporate law, she concludes, “is one of the largest barriers victims of
corporate human rights abuses face.”132 Maybe. But within the Bauman and
Goodyear opinions lurks an option the Court has yet to deal with that, as I
123
See Beth Stephens, Translating Filartiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of
Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2002).
124
Whether or not the United States should provide relief for such claims at all is not the focus of this
Article, and it is ultimately a question for the lawmaking branches. Notably, under current law, the ATS
and TVPA do provide avenues of relief.
125
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
126
See supra Section II.A.1.
127
Stephens, supra note 123, at 11–12.
128
See id. at 12.
129
See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 (2014).
130
See id. at 758–59.
131
Skinner, supra note 51, at 213.
132
Id.
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will explore, may have the potential to overcome some of Bauman’s
potentially undesirable effects: veil piercing.
B. Veil-Piercing Law133
Veil piercing law is infamous for its incoherency. Commentators
have noted that it “seems to happen freakishly. Like lightning, it is rare,
severe, and unprincipled.”134 Yet piercing the veil for jurisdictional purposes
might be even more perplexing.135 In part, that’s because although the rules
for jurisdictional veil piercing arguably should not have the same moorings—
or at least the same limits—as those for traditional veil piercing, courts have
largely failed to consider the reasoning for their decisions to pierce the veil to
obtain jurisdiction.136 Instead, veil-piercing courts—in both contexts—often
rely on conclusory analyses and terminology to produce result-oriented
decisions.137
The basic question in traditional veil piercing is whether the limited
liability of the corporate form should be disregarded so as to subject the
shareholders or affiliates of a corporation to liability for that corporation’s
acts.138 In the jurisdictional context, on the other hand, the inquiry should
arguably be one of due process: “do the contacts of an affiliated corporation
‘count’ for the purposes of meeting the constitutional tests of ‘minimum
contacts’ and ‘fair play and substantial justice’”?139 As to this, courts
disagree, and the Supreme Court itself has not weighed in since before
International Shoe.140 Some courts thus seem to ignore the distinction and
apply traditional standards—which themselves vary widely—to the
jurisdictional context, while others look to International Shoe and its progeny
to determine whether due process has been satisfied.141 To provide a
background to veil piercing generally, and because courts often apply
traditional veil-piercing standards in the jurisdictional context, I will first deal
with traditional veil piercing. After laying this (admittedly very bare bones)
foundation, I will move on to jurisdictional veil piercing.
133
The summary provided in this Article relies heavily on Phillip Blumberg’s treatise. See generally 1
PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG ET AL., BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS 1 passim (2d ed. Supp. 2010) (providing
a more in-depth look at veil piercing doctrines, including a comprehensive look at some of the caselaw
underlying veil piercing analysis).
134
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 89, 89 (1985).
135
See Daniel G. Brown, Comment, Jurisdiction Over a Corporation on the Basis of the Contacts of
an Affiliated Corporation: Do you have to Pierce the Corporate Veil?, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 595, 595 (1992)
(“When the haze of state jurisdictional law collides with the metaphor-filled fog of the ‘piercing the
corporate veil’ doctrine, the result is, predictably, a smog of the thickest variety.”).
136
See, e.g., id. at 617.
137
See BLUMBERG ET AL., supra note 133, at 10-6.
138
See id. at 10-5.
139
See id.; see also Hoffman v. United Telecomms., Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1463, 1471 (D. Kan. 1983).
140
See infra Section II.B.2.
141
See, e.g., MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2003); see
also Hoffman, 575 F. Supp. at 1471.
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1. Traditional Veil Piercing
Traditional entity law holds that various persons and entities are
legally distinct: a corporation is legally distinct from its shareholders and
related entities within corporate groups are legally distinct from one
another.142 A subsidiary’s rights and liabilities are therefore (in most cases)
legally distinct from its parent’s and vice versa.143 This is generally referred
to as the principle of limited liability. Although limited liability has a number
of apparent justifications, it developed principally as a means to encourage
investors to fund new business ventures so that corporations could collect
capital and put it to efficient uses.144
But, though important, the traditional view of limited liability is not
sacrosanct. Sometimes entity law “is so dysfunctional or leads to such unjust
results that the law has developed a variety of doctrines supporting the
attribution of legal consequences of the acts of one constituent company of a
corporate group to another.”145 Thus, when courts find traditional entity law
grasping in the context of a corporate group,146 they will in equity attribute the
legal rights or duties of one subpart of the corporation to another. Although
there are a number of formulations by which courts do so, such attribution is
generally referred to as “veil piercing” or “disregarding the separate corporate
entities of the related corporations in issue.”147
142
BLUMBERG ET AL., supra note 133, at 10-4 (“Both of these two very different worlds are governed
by the same doctrines indiscriminately, both to a controlled corporation and its individual controlling
shareholder as well as to a corporate group with its controlling parent corporation and its many controlled
subsidiary corporations.”); see Phillip I. Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J. CORP.
L. 573 (1986) (providing a history of limited liability and entity law).
143
See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61 (1998) (“It is a general principle of corporate law
deeply ‘ingrained in our economic and legal systems’ that a parent corporation . . . is not liable for the acts
of its subsidiaries.”). However, commentators have argued that the same limited liability principles should
not apply in the parent-subsidiary context. See John H. Matheson, The Modern Law of Corporate Groups:
An Empirical Study of Piercing the Corporate Veil in the Parent-Subsidiary Context, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1091,
1101 (2009) (“Many commentators argue that whatever the weaknesses of the current judicial tests for
piercing the corporate veil generally, the case for disregarding the corporate entity is more compelling
when the shareholder itself is another corporate entity - namely, that corporations exist in the parentsubsidiary context.”); see also Kurt A. Strasser, Piercing the Veil in Corporate Groups, 37 CONN. L. REV.
637, 664 (2005); see also Blumberg, supra note 142, at 575.
144
See Blumberg, supra note 142, at 574–75.
145
BLUMBERG ET AL., supra note 133, at 10-4; see also Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 62 (“But there is an
equally fundamental principle of corporate law, applicable to the parent-subsidiary relationship as well as
generally, that the corporate veil may be pierced . . . when, inter alia, the corporate form would otherwise
be misused to accomplish certain wrongful purposes, most notably fraud, on the shareholder’s behalf.”).
146
In this Article, “corporate groups” generally refers to parents and subsidiaries.
147
BLUMBERG ET AL., supra note 133, at 10-5. Veil piercing is recognized in both U.S. and
international law as a viable remedy in the event that there is misuse of the corporate form.
In Case Concerning The Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., 1970 I. C. J. 3, the
International Court of Justice acknowledged that, as a matter of international law,
the separate status of an incorporated entity may be disregarded in certain
exceptional circumstances: “Forms of incorporation and their legal personality have
sometimes not been employed for the sole purposes they were originally intended
to serve; sometimes the corporate entity has been unable to protect the rights of those
who have entrusted their financial resources to it; thus inevitably there have arisen
dangers of abuse, as in the case of many other institutions of law. Here, then, as
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Veil piercing thus developed as a means by which courts in equity
could avoid the use of the corporate form to perpetuate an injustice or wrong.
For example, an early veil-piercing case, United States v. Milwaukee
Refrigerator Transit Co., held that the corporate entity may be disregarded
whenever the “entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong,
protect fraud, or defend crime.”148 Similarly, in Fish v. East, the Tenth Circuit
held that the “[c]orporate entity may be disregarded where not to do so will
defeat public convenience, justify wrong or protect fraud.”149 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has likewise observed that the “legal fiction of
a separate corporate entity was designed to serve convenience and justice . . .
and will be disregarded whenever justice or public policy demand and when
the rights of innocent parties are not prejudiced nor the theory of the corporate
entity rendered useless.”150 And the Supreme Court has described veil
piercing as an “equitable principle that the doctrine of corporate entity,
recognized generally and for most purposes, will not be regarded when so to
do would work fraud or injustice.”151
In an effort to avoid the use of the corporate form to perpetuate
injustice or commit a wrong, courts crafted what is now considered traditional
veil piercing: the “instrumentality” and “alter ego” doctrines.152 These
doctrines, although having different names, are largely the same.153 Phillip
Blumberg has described traditional veil piercing to require three elements: (1)
the parent controls the subsidiary such that there is a lack of independent
existence; (2) fraudulent, inequitable, or wrongful use of the corporate form;

elsewhere, the law, confronted with economic realities, has had to provide protective
measures and remedies in the interests of those within the corporate entity as well
as those outside who have dealings with it: the law has recognized that the
independent existence of the legal entity cannot be treated as an absolute. It is in this
context that the process of ‘lifting the corporate veil’ or ‘disregarding the legal
entity’ has been found justified and equitable in certain circumstances or for certain
purposes. The wealth of practice already accumulated on the subject in municipal
law indicates that the veil is lifted, for instance, to prevent misuse of the privileges
of legal personality, as in certain cases of fraud or malfeasance, to protect third
persons such as a creditor or purchaser, or to prevent the evasion of legal
requirements or of obligations. . . . In accordance with the principle expounded
above, the process of lifting the veil, being an exceptional one admitted by municipal
law in respect of an institution of its own making, is equally admissible to play a
similar role in international law. . . .”
First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 628 n.20 (1983) (internal
citations omitted).
148
142 F. 247, 255 (E.D. Wis. 1905).
149
114 F.2d 177, 191 (10th Cir. 1940).
150
Ashley v. Ashley, 393 A.2d 637, 641 (Pa. 1978).
151
Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307, 322 (1939).
152
Unfortunately, some “courts use ‘alter ego’ as one of the conclusory metaphorical terms so
frequently invoked when courts impose liability under piercing jurisprudence––often accompanied by such
similar metaphors as ‘instrumentality,’ ‘agent’ or ‘agency,’ or ‘tool.’” BLUMBERG ET AL., supra note 133,
at 11-8 nn.18–20.
153
See Miles v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 703 F.2d 193, 195 (5th Cir. 1983); Wm. Passalacqua Builders,
Inc. v. Resnick Developers S., Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1261, 1264–65 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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and (3) a causal relationship to the plaintiff’s loss.154
Yet, however precise and strict the requirements for veil piercing may
seem, or however confidently some courts may announce them, the caselaw
shows that the doctrine is far from being settled.155 Some courts actually apply
all three factors, or at least do so in most cases.156 Many courts merely recite
a list of factors with little analysis.157 Blumberg, for example, has identified
more than twenty common factors courts cite as guidelines to justify their
decisions on whether to pierce or not to pierce.158 These “guidelines” are
widely used, but because they “indiscriminately mix elements of vastly
unequal importance and lump together issues of readily ascertainable fact
with complex issues involving the difficult exercise of judgment and utilizing
ultimate standards of a conclusory nature, which presage the outcome of the
case,” they are of limited utility in actually figuring out whether piercing is
appropriate.159 Thus, courts usually note that these factors are non-exhaustive
and, in actuality, consider the totality of the circumstances in deciding
whether to pierce.160
Perhaps due to dissatisfaction with a formal listing of factors without
reference to the equitable bases for veil piercing, many courts have
simultaneously (and sometimes in the same jurisdictions) developed and
applied single-factor piercing tests where they only require one of the
traditional three factors.161 For example, the Second Circuit, while sometimes
purporting to apply the alter-ego test—a traditional three-factor test—
simultaneously adopted a single-factor test, which permits piercing whenever
either a lack of separate existence or the parent’s wrongful or morally
culpable conduct is shown.162 Texas and Louisiana developed the “single
154
See BLUMBERG ET AL., supra note 133, at 11-5. The alter ego formulation usually only contains
two factors, although in practice courts apply it in the same way. See, e.g., Towe Antique Ford Found. v.
IRS, 999 F.2d 1387, 1391 (9th Cir. 1993).
155
BLUMBERG ET AL., supra note 133, at 10-7 (“The traditional three-factor doctrine, whether in its
instrumentality or alter-ego formulation is typically held out as a transcendental standard applicable across
the spectrum of the law and rigidly governing the disregard of entity. In fact, this view is far from accurate.
Classic three-factor piercing coexists with an extensive number of complementary, competing, and
inconsistent doctrines through which American courts have widely disregarded separate identities and
pierced the corporate veil.”).
156
See Matheson, supra note 143, at 1099 (“Unfortunately, the tests used by the courts to determine
the existence of these elements are vague and inconsistent.”).
157
See id. at 1099 n.20.
158
BLUMBERG ET AL., supra note 133, at 11-31 to -32.
159
Id. at 11-32 to -33.
160
See, e.g., Hollowell v. Orleans Reg’l Hosp., 217 F.3d 379, 387 (5th Cir. 2000); Kaycee Land &
Livestock v. Flahive, 46 P.3d 323, 325 (Wyo. 2002); Riggins v. Dixie Shoring Co., 590 So. 2d 1164, 1169
(La. 1991).
161
Compare Carte Blanche (Singapore) Pte., Ltd. v. Diners Club Int’l, Inc., 2 F.3d 24, 26 (2d Cir.
1993), with Thrift Drug, Inc. v. Universal Prescription Adm’rs, 131 F.3d 95, 97 (2d Cir. 1997). But see
Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. 1986) (“Many Texas cases have blurred the
distinction between alter ego and the other bases for disregarding the corporate fiction. . . . However, . . .
alter ego is only one of the bases for disregarding the corporate fiction.” (internal citations omitted)).
162
See Wm. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers S., Inc., 933 F.2d 131, 138 (2d Cir.
1991); S.M. v. Oxford Health Plans (N.Y.), Inc., 94 F. Supp. 3d 481, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting Carte
Blanche, 2 F.3d at 26) (“New York courts will only pierce the corporate veil to ‘prevent fraud or other
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enterprise doctrine,”163 which applied “when corporations are not operated as
separate entities, but rather integrate their resources to achieve a common
business purpose.”164 This is done even though such single-factor tests are
“flatly contrary to the fundamental principle of classic piercing.”165 Indeed,
“courts have consistently disregarded the separate corporate entity of
controlled corporations under circumstances that did not satisfy the classic
standards.”166
Additionally, and importantly for the analysis that will follow, the
Supreme Court and other federal courts have fashioned an alternate test to
skirt traditional veil piercing when important federal interests might otherwise
be thwarted. In a series of holdings, the Court “has consistently refused to
give effect to the corporate form where it is interposed to defeat legislative
policies”167 or “an overriding public policy.”168 This federal interests piercing
doctrine, though derived from the foundational principle that piercing should
prevent injustice,169 took on a distinct form during the Great Depression and
New Deal. In Anderson v. Abbott, for example, the Court disregarded the
corporate veil between a bank holding company and former bank shareholders
so as to impose double liability under the National Banking Act, even though
there was no proof that the holding company at issue was being used to shield
shareholders.170 The Court noted that it was “dealing . . . with a principle of
[limited] liability which is concerned with realities not forms.”171 It therefore
reasoned that utilizing piercing to impose liability upon the former
shareholders—whose investment in the holding company was really just an
investment in the bank—was the only way to satisfy the mandates of the
National Banking Act.172 This was so despite “[t]he fact that Congress did
wrong, or where a parent dominates and controls a subsidiary.’”); see also Capital Tel. Co. v. FCC, 498
F.2d 734, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (“[A] corporate entity may be disregarded in the interests of public
convenience, fairness and equity.”); BLUMBERG ET AL., supra note 133, at 12-49 (“Some [single-factor
doctrines] focus on particular conduct that is itself wrongful, unjust, or inequitable, and these require no
additional proof either of excessive control and lack of indicia of separate existence or causality.”).
163
The “single enterprise doctrine” is now defunct in Texas. See PHC-Minden, L.P. v. Kimberly-Clark
Corp., 235 S.W.3d 163, 175 (Tex. 2007).
164
E.g., Paramount Petroleum Corp. v. Taylor Rental Ctr., 712 S.W.2d 534, 536 (Tex. App. 1986),
abrogated by SSP Partners v. Gladstrong Invs. Corp., 275 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. 2008).
165
See BLUMBERG ET AL., supra note 133, at 12-3. Blumberg notes that the flourishing of single-factor
doctrines, although it “may go almost entirely unheralded, . . . are a vital part of the contemporary American
scene. This,” he comments, “is a striking anomaly.” Id. at 11-35.
166
Id. at 12-49.
167
First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 630 (1983) (citing
Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 362–63 (1944)).
168
Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Co., 417 U.S. 703, 713 (1974); see also
BLUMBERG ET AL., supra note 133, at 13-4 (“In determining matters where the public interest is at stake,
federal courts have been unwilling to have corporate form rather than substance determine the outcome.”).
169
See Anderson, 321 U.S. at 363 (quoting Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minneapolis Civic
& Commerce Ass’n, 247 U.S. 490, 501 (1918)) (“‘[C]ourts will not permit themselves to be blinded or
deceived by mere forms of law’ but will deal ‘with the substance of the transaction involved as if the
corporate agency did not exist and as the justice of the case may require.’”).
170
Id. at 363–64.
171
Id. at 363.
172
Id.
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not outlaw holding companies . . . nor undertake to regulate them,” because
the fact that holding companies were allowed under the law “hardly impl[ied]
that Congress sanctioned their use to defeat the [legislative] policy,” and “[t]o
allow [the] holding company device to succeed would be to put the policy . .
. at the mercy” of the corporation.173
While the Court developed this rule in cases where the corporate form
would have impeded legislative goals in legislative and regulatory schemes
arising during the New Deal,174 it has also refused to apply traditional veil
piercing law and disregarded the entity in other substantive areas, such as
antitrust law.175 And consistent with the Court’s lead, “[i]nstead of allowing
corporate forms to determine an issue of public importance,” courts in these
cases seek to implement “the underlying objectives and policies of the statute”
and, further, “to prevent frustration of the law and ready avoidance through
interposition of a subsidiary or affiliate company.”176 They thus reject lack of
compliance with corporate form as essential177 and instead accept “their
responsibility to apply regulatory and remedial statutes generally to prevent
frustration of the underlying public policy and avoidance of the statutory
objectives by manipulation of the corporate forms.”178
In sum, traditional veil piercing is a messy and often incoherent area
of the law. Yet judicial developments such as the proliferation of singlefactor tests, the all-too-common use of conclusory analyses, and relaxed
piercing standards when federal interests are at stake may provide some
Id. at 363–64.
See, e.g., Elec. Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419, 434–43 (1938) (disregarding traditional
entity law and applying enterprise principles to uphold the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935
as constitutional); Anderson, 321 U.S. at 368–69 (upholding imposition of statutory liability on
shareholders under the National Banking Act even when there was no proof that the holding company was
an attempt to shield bank shareholders from liability).
175
See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 772 n.18 (1984) (noting that
traditional entity law was “inadequate to preserve the Sherman Act’s distinction between unilateral and
concerted conduct”); see also United States v. Clinical Leasing Serv., Inc., 982 F.2d 900, 901 n.3 (5th Cir.
1992) (noting, in a suit seeking fees under the Federal Controlled Substances Act, that the “frustration of
a legislative purpose[]” is a “well-established” theory with which a court can pierce the corporate veil).
176
See BLUMBERG ET AL., supra note 133, at 13-5. Blumberg calls this “federal modified piercing
jurisprudence.” Id.
177
See, e.g., Capital Tel. Co. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 734, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding that because “courts
have consistently recognized that a corporate entity may be disregarded in the interests of public
convenience, fairness and equity,” the court “need not pause to consider whether Capital would be Bakal’s
alter ego under the strict standards of the common law alter ego doctrine which would apply in a tort or
contract action”); see also United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d 1080,
1091–92 (1st Cir. 1992) (applying the relaxed legislative policies piercing standard in an ERISA case).
178
BLUMBERG ET AL., supra note 133, at 13-5; see, e.g., Papa v. Katy Indus., Inc., 166 F.3d 937, 941
(7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J.) (“[A]n enterprise might split itself up into a number of corporations . . . for
the express purpose of avoiding liability . . . in such a way as to avoid creating the conditions in which the
corporate veil is normally pierced. Each subsidiary might be adequately funded and comply with all the
requisite formalities for separate corporate status . . . . But if the purpose of this splintered incorporation
were to elude liability under the antidiscrimination laws, the corporations should be aggregated . . .
[because] [t]he privilege of separate incorporation is not intended to allow enterprises to duck their
statutory duties.”).
173
174
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insight for predicting a court’s treatment of a veil-piercing issue. First, the
single-factor tests and legislative policy standard can help one consider the
relative weight that should be given to each traditional factor. If a singlefactor test is unavailable in a jurisdiction in which a plaintiff is looking to
pierce, that plaintiff may at least be able to point to other jurisdictions’ singlefactor tests as evidence that the particular factor is entitled to greater weight.
Second, and maybe more importantly, the proliferation of these tests is
evidence that courts have not felt bound to the rigid three-factor formulation,
especially when the three-factor analysis would preclude an equitable result.
Or, in other words, such developments show that courts, despite sometimes
applying rigid three-factor tests, often allow the purpose of veil piercing and
the policies of the underlying substantive law to be determinative.
Conclusory opinions likewise evidence that some courts—although
considering themselves duty-bound to follow precedent—are willing to forgo
rigorous analysis in order to accommodate equitable factors.179
2. Jurisdictional Veil Piercing
Jurisdictional veil piercing is likewise unsettled, with courts and
commentators divided on the proper analysis.180 This is ostensibly due in part
to the tension between the Supreme Court’s opinion in Cannon
Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., which applied a single-factor
variant of traditional veil piercing standards to a jurisdictional issue, and the
personal jurisdictional revolution resulting from International Shoe.181 Due
to the nature of modern personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, among other
factors, Cannon’s continuing authority and relevance has been called into
doubt by both courts and commentators.182 Thus, this Section is divided into
two subsections. In the first I will discuss Cannon and the cases following it.
In the second I will discuss a line of courts holding, and commentators
arguing, that Cannon is no longer relevant in a post-International Shoe world.
Other courts and commentators fall somewhere in between these two poles.183
a. The Cannon Doctrine and Traditional Piercing for Jurisdiction
In Cannon, a North Carolina corporation sued a Maine corporation in
179
See, e.g., Craig v. Johns-Manville Corp., No. 82-0321, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4075, at *36 (E.D.
Pa. Apr. 22, 1987) (holding that piercing was appropriate despite failing to formally satisfy elements when
the parent underwent reorganization to “defeat[] . . . [the victim’s] litigation remedy by corporate decisions,
policies and practices which insulate [the corporation] from any liability whatsoever”).
180
See Brown, supra note 135, for an analysis of this topic and a collection of cases either following
or not following Cannon.
181
267 U.S. 333, 334–35 (1925).
182
See infra Section II.B.2.
183
See generally John A. Swain & Edwin E. Aguilar, Piercing the Veil to Assert Personal Jurisdiction
Over Corporate Affiliates: An Empirical Study of the Cannon Doctrine, 84 B.U. L. REV. 445 (2004)
(discussing the fading of the Cannon doctrine and identifying the causes underlying the treatment of
Cannon by the lower courts).
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North Carolina court for breach of contract.184 Service of process was made
on the local agent of an Alabama corporation, which was a wholly owned
subsidiary of the Maine corporate defendant.185 Thus, to sustain the validity
of the service, the plaintiff sought to pierce the veil between the Maine parent
and its Alabama subsidiary whose agent had been served in North Carolina.186
The Supreme Court framed the issue as whether the parent was “doing
business within [North Carolina] in such a manner and to such an extent as to
warrant the inference that it was present there.”187 Citing only federal
common law and noting that no constitutional questions were at issue,188 the
Court held that North Carolina could not assert jurisdiction over the Maine
corporation because corporate formalities and separation had been neatly
maintained, stating:
Through ownership of the entire capital stock and otherwise,
the defendant dominates the Alabama corporation,
immediately and completely; and exerts its control both
commercially and financially in substantially the same way,
and mainly through the same individuals, as it does over
those selling branches or departments of its business not
separately incorporated which are established to market the
Cudahy products in other States. The existence of the
Alabama company as a distinct corporate entity is, however,
in all respects observed. Its books are kept separate. All
transactions between the two corporations are represented by
appropriate entries in their respective books in the same way
as if the two were wholly independent corporations.189
The Court thus refused to find that the presence of the Alabama subsidiary in
North Carolina could be imputed to the parent to establish jurisdiction: “[W]e
cannot say that for purposes of jurisdiction, the business of the Alabama
corporation in North Carolina became the business of the defendant.”190
On its face, and sometimes as applied, Cannon stands for the rigid
proposition that so long as formal separation is maintained between a parent
and subsidiary, the presence (or “doing business”) of one in a state will not
determine the jurisdiction of the other.191 Indeed, in a case involving whether
267 U.S. at 334.
Id.
186
Id. at 334–35.
187
Id.
188
Id. at 336 (“No question of the constitutional powers of the State, or of the federal Government, is
directly presented.”). Cannon was decided 13 years before the Court in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins held
that federal courts sitting in diversity must apply state law. 304 U.S. 64, 79–80 (1938); see also Swain &
Aguilar, supra note 183, at 456 (questioning Cannon’s authority on the basis that federal court’s sitting in
diversity must apply state law).
189
Cannon, 267 U.S. at 335.
190
Id. at 338.
191
Id. at 337–38.
184
185
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the district court had diversity jurisdiction, the Sixth Circuit has so stated the
Cannon principle: “When formal separation is maintained between a
corporate parent and its corporate subsidiary, federal court jurisdiction over
the subsidiary is determined by that corporation’s citizenship, not the
citizenship of the parent.”192 And thus broadly viewed, Cannon imposes an
even stricter requirement than traditional three-factor piercing, which would
entertain disregarding an entity even if there were formal separation if the
parent exercised substantial control over the subsidiary.193
However, it is important to recognize that Cannon was decided in
1925, “when American law still overwhelmingly reflected the formalistic
approach of nineteenth-century jurisprudence” and when, due to the relative
absence of long-arm statutes, “American courts were still relying on the
concepts of presence and its corporate surrogate, doing business, as the
analytical standards for determining the existence of jurisdiction.”194 As
discussed above, the Court’s 1945 decision in International Shoe shifted the
constitutional jurisdictional analysis away from the type of formalism
enshrined in Cannon.195 Moreover, Cannon itself presented a narrow issue.
It involved the construction of a North Carolina statute that established “doing
business” as the standard for determining jurisdiction as it applied in deciding
whether the federal courts had diversity jurisdiction over an out-of-state
corporation.196 Finally, because the Court seemingly based its holding on
federal common law, it seems that Cannon would not have survived Erie.197
Indeed, Blumberg notes that it seems “Cannon and formalism have become
irrelevant.”198
Thus, Cannon can fairly easily be distinguished on its facts or based
upon the shift in the legal landscape since 1925. And it makes sense that
although many lower courts (but not all, especially after Erie and
International Shoe) have followed Cannon, they have done so with differing
levels of vigor.199 Perhaps surprisingly, then, in a 2004 empirical study, John
192
Schwartz v. Elec. Data Sys., Inc., 913 F.2d 279, 283 (6th Cir. 1990). The Sixth Circuit has also
held to the contrary: “[T]he law relating to the fictions of agency and of separate corporate entity was
developed for purposes other than determining amenability to personal jurisdiction, and the law of such
amenability is merely confused by reference to these inapposite matters.” Velandra v. Regie Nationale des
Usines Renault, 336 F.2d 292, 297 (6th Cir. 1964). But see Pro Tanks Leasing v. Midwest Propane &
Refined Fuels, LLC, 988 F. Supp. 2d 772, 778 (W.D. Ky. 2013) (“[T]he issue of personal jurisdiction
largely turns on whether Midwest was the ‘alter ego’ of Innovative and Grundy.”).
193
See Swain & Aguilar, supra note 183, at 455–56; BLUMBERG ET AL., supra note 133, at 24-9 to 10.
194
BLUMBERG ET AL., supra note 133, at 24-3; see also Brunswick Corp. v. Suzuki Motor Co., 575 F.
Supp. 1412, 1418 (E.D. Wis. 1983) (noting Cannon was based on “old territorial due process notion” of
Pennoyer).
195
See supra Section II.A.2.
196
See Cannon, 267 U.S. at 334.
197
See Murray E. Knudsen, Comment, Jurisdiction Over a Corporation Based on the Contracts of a
Related Corporation: Time for a Rule of Attribution, 92 DICK. L. REV. 917, 924 (1988).
198
BLUMBERG ET AL., supra note 133, at 24-5.
199
See, e.g., Echeverry v. Kellogg Switchboard & Supply Co., 175 F.2d 900, 903 (2d Cir. 1949) (“In
this field, realism, not formalism, should be dominant; the problem must be solved in the light of
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Swain and Edwin Aguilar found that Cannon had been cited in at least 553
published decisions, which, in conjunction with other findings, led them to
conclude that Cannon retains validity in modern courts.200 However, and
perhaps less surprisingly, many of the opinions citing Cannon do not actually
apply Cannon strictly, and some courts have rejected its strict approach
altogether.201
On the other hand, some courts have strictly followed Cannon. These
courts have applied Cannon literally and refused to attribute one related
entity’s contacts to another to establish jurisdiction so long as the entities have
maintained formal separation.202 Yet other courts, while paying lip service to
Cannon, have instead applied tests more akin (or in some cases identical) to
those applied in the traditional veil-piercing context, such as a three-factor
test, some sort of single-factor test, or the legislative policies standard.203 For
example, in United Electric, Radio and Machine Workers v. 163 Pleasant
Street Corp., the First Circuit cited Cannon as the default rule, noting that
“[o]rdinarily, courts respect the legal independence of a corporation and its
subsidiary when determining if a court’s jurisdiction over the offspring begets
jurisdiction over the parent.”204 However, rather than apply Cannon’s rigid
rule, the court applied the relaxed federal standard for piercing when
respecting the corporate form would “stymie legislative policies.”205 Thus, it
held that
a federal court, in deciding what veil-piercing test to apply,
commercial actuality, not in the aura of juristic semantics.”). See Brown, supra note 135, at 602–10, for a
more in-depth discussion on the lines of cases following Cannon.
200
Swain & Aguilar, supra note 183, at 456.
201
Id. at 456–57; Knudsen, supra note 197, at 925. The Texas Supreme Court, for example, recently
cited Cannon but then utilized a slightly less rigid test:
“To ‘fuse’ the parent company and its subsidiary for jurisdictional purposes, the
plaintiffs must prove the parent controls the internal business operations and affairs
of the subsidiary. But the degree of control the parent exercises must be greater than
that normally associated with common ownership and directorship; the evidence
must show that the two entities cease to be separate so that the corporate fiction
should be disregarded to prevent fraud or injustice.”
PHC-Minden, L.P. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 235 S.W.3d 163, 175 (Tex. 2007) (quoting BMC Software
Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 799 (Tex. 2002)).
202
See, e.g., Schwartz v. Elec. Data Sys., Inc., 913 F.2d 279, 283 (6th Cir. 1990).
203
See, e.g., Hargrave v. Fibreboard Corp., 710 F.2d 1154, 1159–60 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that the
degree of control by the parent must be greater than that normally associated with common ownership and
directorship); Russell v. Enter. Rent-A-Car Co., 160 F. Supp. 2d 239, 251–52 (D.R.I. 2001) (citing De
Castro v. Sanifill, Inc., 198 F.3d 282, 283–84 (1st Cir. 1999)) (noting that “in order to establish jurisdiction
over a parent corporation, there must be ‘strong and robust evidence’ of parental control over the subsidiary
rendering the latter a ‘mere shell,’” while also noting that alter ego rule would alternatively allow the court
to exercise jurisdiction over the parent); Kimble v. DPCE, Inc., No. 91-2290, 1991 WL 236468, at *2 (E.D.
Pa. Nov. 5, 1991) (citing Cannon but then refusing to pierce because “plaintiff [had] not shown facts which
support[ed] the finding of an alter ego relationship between DPCE and Granada”); Barber v. Pittsburgh
Corning Corp., 464 A.2d 323, 330–32 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (citing Cannon but finding that exercise of
control by parent was sufficient for court to exercise jurisdiction).
204
United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1091 (1st Cir.
1992).
205
Id. at 1091–92; see supra Section II.B.1.
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should “look closely at the purpose of the federal statute to
determine whether the statute places importance on the
corporate form, an inquiry that usually gives less respect to
the corporate form than does the strict common law alter ego
doctrine.”206
In citing Cannon as authority, but then instead applying other
piercing jurisprudence, courts muddle the distinction between substantive and
jurisdictional precedents, which only further confuses this area of law.207 Yet
these precedents seem to indicate that much of the common-law piercing
jurisprudence can—whether or not it should—apply to both jurisdictional and
substantive issues. Moreover, most of the courts citing and applying Cannon
do so without engaging in any analysis regarding its continued validity, and
without asking whether Cannon actually applies in the given context.208 Still
other courts reject Cannon completely, instead relying on International Shoe
and a minimum contacts analysis.209 And as jurisdiction is really a question
of due process rather than corporate law, many commentators have suggested
that Cannon should be considered irrelevant today.210
b. International Shoe Applied and Due Process Analysis
Cannon was decided using federal common law (before Erie) and
formal distinctions between entities rather than due process (before
International Shoe). Yet, as discussed above, the decision retains what is
perhaps surprising validity in modern courts. Nonetheless, other courts and
many commentators have noted the limits of Cannon and have refused to
apply it, instead focusing on International Shoe’s minimum contacts analysis.
Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Superior Oil Co. is a leading case in
this regard. The issue in Energy Reserves arose in the context of a contract
dispute.211 Energy Reserves, the plaintiff, entered into a contract with
Superior, a Nevada corporation over which jurisdiction was conceded.212
Under that contract, Superior Overseas, a Nevada corporation with its
principal place of business in England, although not party to the contract,
incurred certain rights and obligations.213 After Energy Reserves served
United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 960 F.2d at 1092.
See Floyd v. IRS, 151 F.3d 1295, 1299 n.4 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting that jurisdictional piercing
precedents should not be relied upon in the substantive context); Rasmussen v. GMC, 803 N.W.2d 623,
641 (Wis. 2011) (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (“[T]he circuit court and the majority opinion tread in
murky waters when they use indeterminate substantive legal tests, such as piercing the corporate veil, to
determine whether general personal jurisdiction lies.”).
208
See, e.g., Alvarado-Morales v. Dig. Equip. Corp., 843 F.2d 613, 616 (1st Cir. 1988) (citing Cannon
but then saying corporate separateness could be overcome under traditional veil piercing theory without
discussing whether or why Cannon actually applied).
209
See infra Section II.B.2.b.
210
See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 117, at 753; Brilmayer & Paisley, supra note 117, at 3–4.
211
460 F. Supp. 483, 488–89 (D. Kan. 1978).
212
Id.
213
Id
206
207
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Superior Overseas in Texas pursuant to the Kansas long-arm statute, Superior
Overseas contested personal jurisdiction.214
Superior and Superior Overseas argued both that “the two
corporations have scrupulously maintained their separate corporate identities
and that plaintiffs have demonstrated none of those facts necessary for a
finding that the corporate veil may be pierced[] [and] that [they] lack[ed]
contacts with the form sufficient to render proper [the court’s] exercise of
jurisdiction.”215 Declining to decide whether the veil could be pierced, the
court found jurisdiction over Superior Overseas.216 Specifically, it concluded
“that alter ego principles no longer play any proper role in the analysis of the
constitutional propriety of the exercise of jurisdiction properly invoked by
service authorized by statute.”217
In coming to this conclusion, the Energy Reserves court extensively
examined federal jurisdiction jurisprudence, to which it found Cannon
inapposite.218 That was so, the court reasoned, because Cannon was both
based on the physical presence doctrine of Pennoyer and decided during the
reign of the “doing business” test for jurisdiction over corporations.219 Given
the fact that International Shoe and Shaffer had abolished the presence
requirement for jurisdiction, the court determined that “doing business” was
no longer a necessary analysis.220
A number of courts and commentators have reached similar
conclusions and thus denounced Cannon as controlling, at least in many
circumstances.221 In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, for
example, the Central District of California held that although “[m]any courts
conflate the requirements of due process and alter ego liability[,] . . . the
‘minimum contacts’ approach of International Shoe clearly has supplanted

Id. at 489.
Id.
Id. (“Relying on the concepts of fundamental fairness and substantial justice, this Court is compelled
to hold that personal jurisdiction over Superior Overseas is both authorized by statute and properly within
the confines of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
217
Id. at 490.
218
Id. (“[Cannon] must no longer be followed. The Court finds Cannon to be limited in scope or
modified in holding by International Shoe and its progeny. Reliance on the rule of Cannon is unsound
when extraterritorial service is authorized by statute and when personal jurisdiction is predicated on the
due process standards of International Shoe.”).
219
Id. at 498.
220
Id. at 496.
221
See, e.g., Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1977) (reversing
district court’s application of Cannon and remanding for full jurisdictional analysis); Velandra v. Regie
Nationale des Usines Renault, 336 F.2d 292, 297 (6th Cir. 1964) (“[T]he law relating to the fictions of
agency and of separate corporate entity was developed for purposes other than determining amenability to
personal jurisdiction, and the law of such amenability is merely confused by reference to these inapposite
matters.”); Alto Eldorado P’ship v. Amrep Corp., 124 P.3d 585, 593 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005) (“This Court is
not bound by [Cannon’s] restraints.”); Brunswick Corp. v. Suzuki Motor Co., 575 F. Supp. 1412, 1419–
21 (E.D. Wis. 1983) (“[A]lter ego principles have no place in assessing the constitutionality of an exercise
of jurisdiction . . . .”); Brilmayer & Paisley, supra note 117.
214
215
216
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the mechanical, formalistic approach of cases like Cannon.”222 Notably, that
court also went on to observe that “[i]n the parent-subsidiary context, several
courts have articulated [the minimum contacts analysis] as a requirement that
plaintiff show either ‘(1) attribution, that the absent parent instigated the
subsidiary’s local activity; or (2) merger, that the absent parent and the
subsidiary are in fact a single legal entity.’”223 Ultimately, the Grokster court
found that the entity relationship at issue “include[d] the indicia of both
attribution and merger,” and thus jurisdiction over the parent was proper.224
c. Summary
Jurisdictional veil-piercing law is in flux. Some courts apply Cannon,
many others purport to apply Cannon but instead apply traditional veilpiercing standards, while still others reject Cannon as anachronistic and apply
International Shoe’s minimum contacts analysis. Litigants and courts in this
area thus are confronted with varying and often inconsistent precedents,
which, while confusing, seemingly also provide additional arguments for
plaintiffs seeking to pierce.
III. VEIL PIERCING AS A MEANS TO HALE FOREIGN
CORPORATIONS INTO U.S. COURTS
In both Bauman and Goodyear, the Supreme Court refused to weigh
in on the viability of veil piercing to hale foreign corporations into U.S. courts
on the basis of their subsidiaries’ contacts.225 In Goodyear, the Court found
that the plaintiffs had forfeited their veil-piercing argument, leaving few clues
as to how the Court might view such a claim and citing a law review article
explaining jurisdictional veil piercing.226 In that article, Brilmayer and
Paisley argue that state veil-piercing standards, rather than a unified federal
standard, should generally apply to jurisdictional veil piercing: “[D]ue
process should take into account only bona fide state substantive relations,
and that it should truncate such substantive relations only in certain limited
circumstances.”227 The question to be asked, they contend, “ought not to be
whether the defendant is protecting itself from suit. Instead, the question
should be whether the defendant in so protecting itself is undermining or
243 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
Id. at 1099 (quoting Third Nat’l Bank v. WEDGE Grp. Inc., 882 F.2d 1087, 1094 (6th Cir. 1989)
(Keith, J., concurring)). These concepts are explained in-depth in Brilmayer and Paisley’s article. See
Brilmayer & Paisley, supra note 117.
224
243 F. Supp. 2d at 1100.
225
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 759 (2014) (discussing, but not passing judgment on, alter
ego and agency theories for obtaining general jurisdiction over foreign affiliates); Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2857 (2011) (acknowledging jurisdictional veil piercing
theory, but declining to address it because it was not previously raised).
226
Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2857 (citing Brilmayer & Paisley, supra note 117, at 29–30).
227
Brilmayer & Paisley, supra note 117, at 28. But see Schwartz, supra note 117, at 753 (proposing a
uniform jurisdictional veil piercing test grounded in federal due process rather than traditional state veil
piercing standards).
222
223
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furthering the underlying policies.”228 One could try to argue that such a
citation supports using traditional piercing standards in jurisdictional cases,
which also seems to be what courts are doing, but as the Court did not
comment on the merits of the article, no strong inferences can be made.
Bauman likewise offers little help. There, the Court gave a slight hint
in that it shot down the Ninth Circuit’s analysis, but it did not give any view
as to whether traditional veil piercing, or any analysis that would not always
“yield a pro-jurisdiction answer,” would be permissible.229 The question is
thus open, and lower courts are left to iron out the details of jurisdictional veil
piercing, which, as discussed above, is a particularly muddled area of law.230
Such opacity likely means that there will be hurdles in veil-piercing law for
foreign human rights plaintiffs (or any plaintiffs) attempting to
jurisdictionally pierce a U.S. subsidiary to reach a foreign parent. Yet if they
can be overcome, veil piercing also seems to present an opportunity for
litigants scratching their heads after Bauman and the Court’s recent
curtailment of general jurisdiction. Before getting into how these litigants
might be able to pierce in line with existing law, however, it is necessary to
discuss why jurisdictional veil piercing could make sense in the human rights
litigation context.231
A. Does Veil Piercing Make Sense in Human Rights Claims?
As discussed above, veil piercing is a “tool of equity . . . appropriately
utilized ‘when the court must prevent fraud, illegality, or injustice, or when
the recognition of the corporate entity would defeat public policy or shield
someone from liability for a crime.’”232 Piercing U.S. subsidiaries to reach
foreign parent corporations that have committed human rights violations
abroad is thus arguably consistent with the broader purposes of veil piercing.
As discussed in Part II, because outside of U.S. courts foreign plaintiffs will
often have no other recourse against foreign corporations for human rights
violations committed abroad, not piercing the veil in such cases to obtain
jurisdiction over the foreign parent defeats the broad public policy of
providing redress for victims of human rights violations and shields the
Brilmayer & Paisley, supra note 117, at 32.
See Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 759.
230
See supra Section II.B; see also Brown, supra note 135, at 595 (“When the haze of state
jurisdictional law collides with the metaphor-filled fog of the ‘piercing the corporate veil’ doctrine, the
result is, predictably, a smog of the thickest variety.”).
231
See Jodie A. Kirshner, Why Is the U.S. Abdicating the Policing of Multinational Corporations to
Europe?: Extraterritoriality, Sovereignty, and the Alien Tort Statute, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 259, 265
(2012) (noting the consequences of applying limited liability to multinational corporations is such that
“[m]ultinationals can exploit [limited liability] to shield parent corporations from liability for human rights
abuses committed by their foreign subsidiaries”).
232
Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Roman Ceramics Corp., 603 F.2d 1065, 1069 (3d Cir. 1979) (quoting Zubik
v. Zubik, 384 F.2d 267, 272 (3d Cir. 1967)). Former Harvard Dean Robert Clark argues inequitable
conduct—or the use of the corporate form to commit a fraud or misrepresentation—is the lynchpin of veil
piercing analysis. See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 2.1, at 37–38 (1986).
228
229
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foreign parent for its bad acts.233 From the broadest policy lens, therefore,
relaxed piercing in human rights cases is a reasonably good fit. But the
strength of the argument for piercing varies depending on the level of
generality at which the public policy is viewed, as well as the policy that is
considered. From at least some perspectives, it can be argued that even from
a narrower policy lens, piercing to hale foreign parents into U.S. courts
furthers the equitable purposes of piercing and of the substantive law of
human rights.
To start, the broad goals of veil piercing fit fairly well.234 The
principle justification for limited liability is to encourage investors to fund
new investments.235 This justification, and indeed a number of other
justifications advanced for limited liability, has little or no application in the
parent-subsidiary context.236 Thus, “courts have evinced a ‘greater
willingness to reach the assets of corporate as opposed to personal
shareholders.’”237 However, as commentators have noted, this may not be
driving the courts completely, as limited liability “continues to apply to
corporate owners within multinational corporations, without distinguishing
their incentives from those of human investors.”238 This can have a negative
effect in certain human rights cases, as multinational corporations can
“strategically insulate dangerous activities within separate entities, [which]
ensures that each one remains legally separate in spite of their economic
interdependence, and [then] limited liability protects the parent corporations
against responsibility.”239 In certain cases (e.g., when a parent sets up a
subsidiary in a high-risk area knowing it might engage in human rights
violations), allowing the parent corporations to avoid liability by way of the
corporate veil seems to be pretty inequitable.
Moreover, the corporate form ought not to be a tool to encourage
wrongful conduct.240 Indeed, it seems that this concern was the impetus for
the creation of piercing as an equitable remedy in the first place.241 In the
substantive liability context, it has been observed that “[i]f those in control of
See supra notes 225–31 and accompanying text; see also Kirshner, supra note 231, at 265.
See Brilmayer & Paisley, supra note 117, at 32 (“[T]he question should be whether the defendant
in so protecting itself is undermining or furthering the underlying policies.”).
235
See Blumberg, supra note 142, at 574–75.
236
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW
41–62 (1991) (discussing bases for limited liability, none of which apply to the parent-subsidiary context);
Kirshner, supra note 231, at 265.
237
Birbara v. Locke, 99 F.3d 1233, 1237 n.3 (1st Cir. 1996); White v. Winchester Land Dev. Corp.,
584 S.W.2d 56, 62 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979). But see Matheson, supra note 143, at 1091.
238
Kirshner, supra note 231, at 265.
239
Id.
240
See David Millon, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Financial Responsibility, and the Limits of Limited
Liability, 56 EMORY L.J. 1305, 1348 (2007) (“It is not at all clear that shareholders who behave
opportunistically should . . . enjoy the limited liability shield.”).
241
See United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 255 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1905)
(piercing should be available whenever the “entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong,
protect fraud, or defend crime”).
233
234
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a corporation cause it to engage in conduct that is likely to result in injury to
third parties, they act irresponsibly if the corporation lacks the means to pay
compensation through liability insurance or cash reserves.”242 The concern is
that corporate groups or actors will utilize the corporate form to unduly shift
the risk of their dangerous activities onto tort victims.243 In the jurisdictional
context this concern, while of a different flavor, is of the same essence. Even
if there is no financial irresponsibility, the mere use of the corporate form to
shield alien parents or subsidiaries means that those alien entities will not be
amenable to jurisdiction and thus will not be held liable, at all, for their
wrongful acts. Arguably, to achieve the same equitable goal in the
jurisdictional context, piercing should be utilized more liberally.
The policy relating to the vindication of human rights, while
intertwined with some of the veil-piercing policy discussed above, also
appears to favor relaxed piercing when foreign human rights plaintiffs sue
foreign corporations for foreign conduct in U.S. courts. That is because
“[a]bsent a cause of action in the United States courts, some of the most
egregious cases of human rights violations might go unheard because regimes
that commit the most serious human rights abuses often possess the most
woefully inadequate legal mechanisms for redressing those abuses.”244
Congress appears to have recognized as much and has responded by enacting
the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (“TVPA”)—“[a]n Act [t]o carry
out obligations of the United States under the United Nations Charter and
other international agreements pertaining to the protection of human rights by
establishing a civil action for recovery of damages from an individual who
engages in torture or extrajudicial killing.”245 More specifically, the TVPA
was enacted to “carry out the intent of the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment [(the “CAT”)],
which was ratified by the U.S. Senate” in 1990 “by making sure that torturers
and death squads will no longer have a safe haven in the United States.”246
Congress, by enacting the TVPA, has evinced what appears to be a clear
federal policy of protecting international human rights.247 Piercing the veil of
Millon, supra note 240, at 1373.
Id. at 1347 (recognizing that while “limited liability is designed to function as a risk allocation
device[,] . . . [i]t is not at all clear that shareholders who behave opportunistically should also enjoy the
limited liability shield”); see also Kirshner, supra note 231, at 264 (“Many multinational corporations
operate in conflict-affected regions where ‘bad things are known to happen,’ structuring their risky
ventures to avoid liability.”).
244
Arce v. Garcia, 434 F.3d 1254, 1261–62 (11th Cir. 2006).
245
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, H.R. 2092, 102d Cong. (1992); see also Torture Victim
Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified as note to 28 U.S.C. § 1350).
246
S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3 (1991).
247
Chavez v. Carranza, 559 F.3d 486, 492 (6th Cir. 2009) (“The TVPA and the ATS share a common
purpose in protecting human rights internationally.”); see also S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3–4 (“Judicial
protection against flagrant human rights violations is often least effective in those countries where such
abuses are most prevalent. A state that practices torture and summary execution is not one that adheres to
the rule of law. Consequently, the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) is designed to respond to this
situation by providing a civil cause of action in U.S. courts for torture committed abroad.”).
242
243
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foreign parent corporations engaged in human rights violations abroad so as
to subject them to U.S. court jurisdiction, when victims would otherwise be
unable to recover, would arguably further this policy.
But, as to this, the level of generality with which one argues the
TVPA’s policy is important. Sure, the TVPA was enacted in large part
pursuant to the CAT,248 and that multilateral treaty provides that “[e]ach State
Party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences under its criminal law”249
and “shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains
redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation.”250
To be sure, however, “torture” is confined to acts “inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity.”251 Aside from this “state action”-like
requirement, the treaty is pretty broad, and there is support in the legislative
history of the TVPA for a similarly broad policy understanding.252 Yet a
narrower focus on the text of the TVPA itself brings to light a few major
problems as to its applicability in the piercing context. For starters, like the
CAT, the TVPA explicitly limits itself to actions against individuals “under
actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation.”253 This
is of course a hurdle, but perhaps not an insurmountable one given the fact
that in a number of the cases in which companies are alleged to have engaged
in torture violations, they were acting in cahoots with the foreign nation’s
government. The bigger problem, it seems, is that the TVPA establishes “a
civil action for recovery of damages from an individual who engages in
torture or extrajudicial killing.”254 And the TVPA’s use of “individual,” per
the Court’s opinion in anderd v. Palestinian Authority, means “that the Act
authorizes liability solely against natural persons.”255 In short, the TVPA does
not apply to corporations.
More generally, however, the broader policy driving the TVPA is that
of the CAT and thus is not limited to natural persons.256 Indeed, the CAT
defines torture without reference to whether it is inflicted by an individual or
other entity,257 and requires signatories to ensure redress is available in their

The CAT has been ratified by the United States. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-367(I), at 3 (1991).
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art.
4, Apr. 18, 1988, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT].
250
Id. art. 14.
251
Id. art. 1.
252
See id.; see also S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3–5 (1991).
253
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified as note
to 28 U.S.C. § 1350).
254
See id.
255
132 S. Ct. 1702, 1707–08 (2012).
256
See generally CAT, supra note 249 (enacted “to make more effective the struggle against torture
and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment throughout the world” and defining torture
broadly).
257
See id. art. 1.
248
249
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respective legal systems.258 That policy might be especially strong when
asking whether veil piercing is appropriate in the human rights litigation
context because veil piercing allows the United States to better comply with
its treaty obligations. When the United States ratified the CAT and enacted
the TVPA, the ATS was still a viable means of bringing suit against juridical
entities for torture violations under Filartiga.259 Thus, at the time, the United
States had in place laws that were interpreted to more fully implement the
CAT (which is not self-executing). Indeed, the Senate recognized as much
when enacting the TVPA, noting that “claims [under the TVPA] do not
exhaust the list of actions that may appropriately be covered by [the ATS]”
and therefore concluding that “that statute should remain intact.”260
But Kiobel and Bauman create a gap in the availability of redress for
victims of foreign human rights violations. Under the CAT, assuming the
color-of-law requirement is satisfied, the United States is obliged to provide
redress for victims of torture.261 Yet, as discussed above, under current law
and without veil piercing, victims of torture at the hands of multinational
corporations will often have no redress in U.S. courts, either because they
cannot establish subject-matter jurisdiction under Kiobel or personal
jurisdiction under Bauman. Piercing seemingly provides a way to remedy or
at least reduce this gap.262 Accordingly, because piercing the parentsubsidiary veil in order to obtain jurisdiction over foreign corporations that
commit human rights violations would serve the purposes of veil piercing, be
in line with the objectives of limited liability, and (at least from a broad policy
lens) further the federal policy of providing redress for human rights
violations, piercing the veil in these cases makes some sense.
B. How Should Litigants Argue?
Preventing use of the corporate form for injustice is the broad policy
of veil piercing. Over time, however, courts have applied this policy to
produce seemingly incoherent and inconsistent results. Some have even
crafted rigid doctrines—such as three-factor piercing—that seem to preclude
equitable results in some cases. Cannon is one of these doctrines, and it seems
to present an insurmountable burden for human rights plaintiffs seeking to
pierce the veil between parents and subsidiaries of multinational corporations.
Broadly applied, it probably does. But, as discussed in Section II.B, veilpiercing doctrine is far from settled, and most courts do not apply Cannon as
258
Id. art. 14 (“Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture
obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation, including the means for as
full rehabilitation as possible.”).
259
See S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 5 (1991) (“[T]he TVPA would extend a civil remedy [beyond that
already existing to aliens under the ATS] to U.S. citizens who may have been tortured abroad.”).
260
Id.
261
See CAT, supra note 249, art. 14.
262
Judicial gap-filling is neither entirely unobjectionable nor always desirable. I address overcoming
such concerns in Section III.B.2 below.
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strictly as it may read. Human rights plaintiffs and courts alike should
recognize the unsettled state of the law in this area, which presents
opportunity to plaintiffs and (for better or worse) flexibility for courts.263 And
plaintiffs have weapons within the arsenal of existing law with which they
can argue that the inequities—in human rights cases, the use of the corporate
form to avoid liability for the commission of human rights violations—justify
piercing.
1. Policy and Purpose
As discussed in Section III.A, the policy underlying veil piercing and
human rights gives plaintiffs what is perhaps their strongest argument for
piercing. Veil piercing is an equitable check on the principle of limited
liability meant to ensure that the corporate form is not used to perpetuate
injustice or cause harm. In the context of obtaining jurisdiction over a
corporate parent in human rights litigation, especially after Goodyear and
Bauman, veil piercing might be necessary for the plaintiff to recover at all.
Absent veil piercing, savvy foreign parent corporations can reap any putative
business benefits of dangerous activities without fear of liability by carefully
separating the corporation into distinct subparts. As the United States is a
primary and favorable forum used by human rights litigants,264 the corporate
form (sans veil piercing) can somewhat easily be used by foreign parents to
insulate themselves from being haled into U.S. court altogether.
In addition to the public policy behind veil piercing and human rights,
it is interesting to note that Justice Sotomayor’s Bauman concurrence is
relevant here. As discussed above, in addition to criticizing the majority’s
rationale, she predicted that “the ultimate effect of the [Bauman] majority’s
approach will be to shift the risk of loss from multinational corporations to
the individuals harmed by their actions.”265 And further that “the majority’s
approach would preclude” plaintiffs harmed by multinational corporations
abroad “from seeking recourse anywhere in the United States even if no other
judicial system was available to provide relief.”266 Though her concerns are
legitimate, her prediction need not come true. Without veil piercing, after
Bauman, the risk will seemingly be shifted to victims of corporate
malfeasance. However, veil piercing provides an escape hatch to Justice
Sotomayor’s dystopia by allowing plaintiffs harmed abroad, who would
otherwise be unable to hale a foreign parent into U.S. court via general
263
See Strasser, supra note 143, at 639 (“[I]n the context of corporate groups, the veil piercing rules
have been sufficiently abstract, malleable, and vague to allow some courts to reach good results.”).
264
See Arce v. Garcia, 434 F.3d 1254, 1261–62 (11th Cir. 2006).
265
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 773 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that
“[u]nder the majority’s rule, for example, a parent whose child is maimed due to the negligence of a foreign
hotel owned by a multinational conglomerate will be unable to hold the hotel to account in a single U.S.
court, even if the hotel company has a massive presence in multiple States”).
266
Id.
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jurisdiction alone, to hale that parent into U.S. court by piercing the veil
between it and its U.S. subsidiary.267 By using veil piercing, therefore, these
plaintiffs would potentially have relief in the United States.
Moreover, Justice Sotomayor’s parity concern—what she called “too
big for general jurisdiction”—would be neutralized.268 She noted that a result
of the majority’s reasoning would be that multinational corporations could
immunize themselves from amenability in U.S. courts, but small
multinationals doing significant business in the United States would be haled
into court to answer for their wrongs abroad.269 This rationale likewise shows
that Bauman favors foreign over U.S. corporations.270 Under Bauman, when
a U.S. corporation harms a plaintiff abroad, that plaintiff will be able to bring
that corporation into court somewhere in the United States. However, the
same plaintiff under the same facts suing a foreign corporation—even one
with extensive U.S. business operations and subsidiaries—might find it near
impossible to establish personal jurisdiction. Using veil piercing would
minimize this disparity, as it would allow the large, multinational corporation
to be haled into U.S. courts for its conduct abroad, even if its operations in a
given state did not meet Bauman’s proportionally test.
2. Legislative Policies Standard: Relief for Human Rights Victims
In terms of established veil-piercing standards, the best fit for
international human rights might be within the Supreme Court-sanctioned
“legislative policies” veil-piercing test discussed above.271 The argument for
the fit is a simple syllogism: There is an expressed legislative policy to
provide relief and a forum for international human rights violations. And
courts should disregard the corporate entity “where it is interposed to defeat
legislative policies.”272 Therefore, courts should disregard the corporate
entity where it is being used to immunize multinational corporations who
have engaged in human rights violations from U.S. court jurisdiction, which
in turn obstructs international human rights plaintiffs’ access to potential
relief.
This argument seems to have some normative appeal. It takes into
account the policies behind veil piercing in addition to those behind
international human rights, which are also, as discussed above, federally
expressed policies.273 And the Court’s announcement of this federal
267
This applies to multinational corporations that have a U.S. subsidiary, subject to general jurisdiction
somewhere in the United States, that the plaintiff could use to hale the parent into court.
268
See Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 764 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
269
See id.
270
See supra Section II.A.2.
271
See, e.g., Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Co., 417 U.S. 703, 713 (1974).
272
First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 630 (1983) (citing
Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 362–63 (1944)).
273
See supra notes 232–35 and accompanying text.
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standard—“that the interposition of a corporation will not be allowed to defeat
a legislative policy, whether that was the aim or only the result of the
arrangement”274—certainly supports relaxed piercing to ensure that the
legislative policy of providing relief to human rights victims is not impeded.
Piercing the veil to obtain jurisdiction in international human rights
cases also at least reasonably (although not perfectly)275 fits within the
caselaw where the Supreme Court’s legislative policies standard has been
applied. In Anderson, for example, the Court pierced the veil between the
bank and holding company and imposed liability on the holding company’s
shareholders even though it assumed the holding company “was organized in
good faith and was not a sham; that it was not organized for a fraudulent
purpose or to conceal enterprises conducted for the benefit of the Bank” and
“that it was not formed as a means for avoiding double liability on the stock
of the Bank . . . .”276 Moreover, the organization of the holding company had
been legal. Yet the Court still found veil piercing appropriate based on
legislative policy alone:
The legislative policy which Congress had long announced
was the policy of double liability. It is that policy with which
we are here concerned. It is that policy, declared by
Congress, which the judicial power may appropriately
protect in the way we have indicated, in absence of a choice
by Congress of another method.277
Like in Anderson, the human rights plaintiff would likely be dealing with a
corporation split into various parts, although not necessarily one split with a
clear purpose of avoiding liability for human rights violations. Under
Anderson, however, this would not matter. The court could assume good faith
and non-fraudulent purposes and yet still find the veil should be pierced
because “[t]he legislative policy which Congress had long announced [is] the
policy of [relief for human rights victims]” and “the interposition of a
corporation [would] . . . defeat [that] legislative policy,” even if that was not
the aim but only the result of the corporate organization.278
Likewise, a plaintiff might look to a case like General Telephone Co.
274
Anderson, 321 U.S. at 363; see also Askew v. R & L Transfer, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1305
(M.D. Ala. 2009). In 1983, the Court reaffirmed Anderson’s standard and, in rejecting an appeal to use
alter ego and instrumentality doctrines when national policies were at stake, even warned “against
permitting worn epithets to substitute for rigorous analysis.” First Nat’l City Bank, 462 U.S. at 623.
275
Some courts have interpreted the legislative policies standard to only relax state common law
piercing standards, rather than rejecting them. See, e.g., Seymour v. Hull & Moreland Eng’g, 605 F.2d
1105, 1111 (9th Cir. 1979) (quoting Bangor Punta Operations Inc., 417 U.S. at 713) (noting that the
“corporate form may be disregarded where used ‘to defeat an overriding public policy,’” but then applying
a test more closely resembling a traditional alter ego test); see also Zubik v. Zubik, 384 F.2d 267, 272–74
(3d Cir. 1967) (citing Anderson but then proceeding to discuss whether formalities were observed).
276
321 U.S. at 356.
277
Id. at 365.
278
See id. at 363, 365.
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v. United States, where the Fifth Circuit held that the veil could be pierced
between non-common-carrier affiliates and their common carrier parent
because to hold otherwise would frustrate a statutory purpose of the
Communications Act of 1934.279 There the court noted that “[w]here the
statutory purpose could thus be easily frustrated through the use of separate
corporate entities,” the veil between parents and their subsidiaries could be
properly pierced.280 This holding could support the human rights plaintiff’s
argument to apply the same piercing standard. And, notably, this standard
has applied in a number of other contexts, including in federal tax law, labor
law, administrative law, the False Claims Act, and criminal forfeiture.281
But this fit is not perfect. Most of the courts applying this federal
piercing standard have considered federally regulated areas of law or
situations in which the federal government has a financial stake. Unlike some
of these cases (e.g., New Deal cases), although the TVPA is a conductregulating statute,282 neither the TVPA nor ATS is part of a broader regulatory
scheme.283 Litigants could thus run into problems because while the
“providing relief for human rights violations” policy rationale fits within the
general legislative policies standard expressed by the Court, the fit within the
relevant caselaw is not seamless.284 But an imperfect fit is probably not fatal,
especially because to disregard the corporate form in such situations would
advance the expressed legislative policy of providing relief for human rights
victims. Still, plaintiffs should be wary. Courts may reject such arguments
and could fairly distinguish cases applying the federal legislative policies
standard. Plaintiffs can, in turn, argue for coherency in legislative policies
piercing: piercing to prevent a foreign parent that has allegedly committed
human rights violations from skirting U.S. jurisdiction supports not only
expressed federal international human rights policy, but also the policies
449 F.2d 846, 855 (5th Cir. 1971).
See id.; see also Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. FERC, 998 F.2d 1313, 1321 (5th Cir. 1993); MCI
Telecomms. Corp. v. O’Brien Mktg., Inc., 913 F. Supp. 1536, 1544 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (“[P]iercing the
corporate veil in the instant case furthers a purpose of the [law] . . . .”).
281
United States v. Emor, 850 F. Supp. 2d 176, 205 (D.D.C. 2012).
282
Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he [TVPA] provides a cause
of action for torture and extrajudicial killing . . . when either the [ATS] or the federal question statute . . .
provides jurisdiction.”).
283
The ATS does not regulate conduct; it is merely a jurisdictional statute that authorizes certain claims
in federal courts. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004). For its part, the TVPA is not
part of the U.S. Code at all; instead, it appears as a note to the ATS. See Torture Victim Protection Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified as note to 28 U.S.C. § 1350). But “[t]hat the
TVPA, which was published in the Statutes at Large, appears in the [U.S.] Code as a historical and statutory
note to the [ATS] does not make the TVPA any less the law of the land.” Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh
Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1251 (11th Cir. 2005).
284
One could additionally argue that the federal policies at issue do not explicitly supplant state law
veil piercing standards. See Note, Piercing the Corporate Law Veil: The Alter Ego Doctrine Under Federal
Common Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 853, 857 (1982) (noting that in “these circumstances, some courts have
automatically adopted state corporate law standards to fill the statutory gaps,” but arguing that the
“automatic application of state law in the absence of express statutory guidelines ignores legal realities”).
However, “most federal courts have not deferred to state law in the absence of express federal statutory
standards; instead, they have resolved corporate veil questions under federal common law.” Id. at 858.
279
280

Published by eCommons, 2016

254

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:2

underlying the doctrine of veil piercing generally.
As discussed above, the level of generality is also important—and
potentially determinative. The TVPA does not by its terms apply to
corporations, but its broader policy and the text of the CAT does.285 Together
with the ATS (at least as it was interpreted prior to Kiobel), the TVPA used
to more comprehensively implement the CAT.286 Now, however, there is a
gap when it comes to corporations.287 Plaintiffs should attempt to argue that
closing this gap—and thereby implementing the CAT—justifies the
utilization of piercing to obtain jurisdiction over corporate human rights
offenders who might otherwise skirt not only amenability to suit, but by
natural extension, liability.
But doing so is not entirely unobjectionable. In effect, the argument
is for judicial gap-filling to implement the terms of a non-self-executing
treaty. Congress, however, did not write the TVPA so broadly, and Kiobel
says the ATS does not apply extraterritorially, which limits the ATS’s
efficacy in reaching foreign human rights violations. While potentially
troublesome, this objection might also provide an important limiting principal
to human rights piercing. That is, because the TVPA does not apply to
corporations, plaintiffs must find subject-matter jurisdiction elsewhere. If in
federal court, the best option might still be the ATS, even as limited by Kiobel.
Piercing, therefore, should arguably not occur unless the underlying claims
over which the U.S. court has subject-matter jurisdiction are at least facially
viable. By arguing as much, plaintiffs would use the ATS to both limit and
bolster their veil-piercing argument. The ATS of course limits the breadth of
the argument because only human rights claims that sufficiently touch and
concern the United States permit an ATS claim and therefore—under this
limited theory—are viable piercing candidates.288
But by limiting, plaintiffs also bolster their argument. To start, by
incorporating the ATS as it can viably be applied (and not just the general
policy underlying it and the TVPA), plaintiffs provide courts with a more
concrete policy basis with which to pierce via federal policy piercing. That
is, by incorporating the ATS per Kiobel, not only do plaintiffs identify an
285
See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified as
note to 28 U.S.C. § 1350); S. REP. NO. 102-249 (1991); CAT, supra note 249; Al Shimari v. CACI Premier
Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 530 (4th Cir. 2014) (“The political branches already have indicated that the
United States will not tolerate acts of torture, whether committed by United States citizens or by foreign
nationals. . . . [T]he TVPA’s broad prohibition against torture reflects Congress’s recognition of a ‘distinct
interest in preventing the United States from becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as well as criminal
liability) for a torturer or other common enemy of mankind.’” (quoting Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1671 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring))).
286
See S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 5 (1991).
287
See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
288
See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669; see also Clegg, supra note 4, at 394 (“When a defendant commits
conduct within the United States that is an essential step in a scheme to consummate conduct abroad giving
rise to a claim under the ATS, the essential step doctrine should be invoked to show that the claim touches
and concerns the United States with sufficient force to displace the presumption.”).
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abstract federal policy, they also provide an applicable statute implementing
that policy. Due to the nature of veil piercing, moreover, use of the ATS may
assuage some of the discomfort courts may (quite rightly) feel about piercing
via a policy for purposes of personal jurisdiction without some assurance that
the underlying substantive law will support a viable cause of action. By at
least stating a facially viable claim under the ATS, therefore, plaintiffs can
provide courts with a more concrete “federal policy” by which to pierce and
offer some assurance that such piercing will not be for naught. Finally, and
relatedly, because common-law courts generally look to effect only
incremental changes in the law (if any),289 a narrower view of federal interests
piercing pursuant to the ATS (as supported by the policy underlying the
TVPA and CAT) is more likely to gain traction. In other words, the side
effects of such a standard are limited by Kiobel; only Bauman is sidestepped,
and only in a narrow set of circumstances.
3. Single-Factor Piercing
Given the disarray in veil-piercing law, courts could also at least
plausibly consider using the corporate form to commit human rights
violations as inequitable conduct under single-factor piercing tests.290 While
this is not technically a Cannon compliant, courts have evinced a willingness
to depart from Cannon to achieve equitable (or even desirable) results.291
Single-factor piercing tests have some support in jurisprudence, and thus a
variant of single-factor piercing could potentially be an option for courts to
pierce the veil on the basis of a multinational corporation’s use of formal
separation to insulate itself from amenability to jurisdiction in human rights
cases.292
However, there are a few major concerns with seeking to use singlefactor piercing tests. First, not all jurisdictions have a single-factor piercing
test that only considers inequitable conduct.293 Indeed, many single-factor
tests instead look to the degree of separation alone, and thus consider only
corporate formalities.294 Second, even if a jurisdiction does recognize a
single-factor piercing test based on inequitable conduct, those same courts
often simultaneously apply traditional three-factor piercing tests.295 This
means that the court may or may not decide to recognize a single-factor test,
289
Cf. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1177 (1989) (“The
law grows and develops, the [common-law] theory goes, not through the pronouncement of general
principles, but case-by-case, deliberately, incrementally, one-step-at-a-time.”).
290
See supra notes 152–56 and accompanying text.
291
See supra notes 152–56 and accompanying text.
292
See Strasser, supra note 143, at 643 (noting some “single factor cases base[] their decisions to pierce
on the fact of wrongful conduct alone[] . . . [and] the potential list of kinds of wrongful conduct is
limitless”).
293
See BLUMBERG ET AL., supra note 133, at 10-29 to -30.
294
See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Ter Maat, 195 F.3d 953, 960 (7th Cir. 1999); BLUMBERG ET
AL., supra note 133, at 12-9.
295
See supra Section II.B.
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even if recognized in the past, if it has a more widely used three-factor
alternative at its disposal. A litigant arguing for a single-factor test would
want to focus on the policy behind piercing and the inequity of depriving a
human rights plaintiff of relief, but given the uncertainty attendant with
single-factor tests, this route—although it might have potential with the right
court or judge—seems to be less viable than the legislative policies
standard.296 Nonetheless, the arguments may coalesce into one; that is, even
if a court does not want to utilize legislative policies for one defect or another,
the broader policy argument might still justify single-factor piercing.
4. Cannon Need Not Apply
Whatever approach a litigant argues, it should be noted that it is
relatively safe for courts to reject a strict application of Cannon. Instead, they
can rely on other potentially more flexible piercing doctrines, such as alter
ego, to show that the veil can be pierced. As discussed above, there is
significant support in the caselaw from which courts can draw on the
proposition that Cannon need not apply in its strictest form.297
5. To Satisfy Due Process
Some courts have declined to treat traditional corporate law
principles as dispositive in determining a foreign parent’s amenability to
jurisdiction, instead relying upon the analysis provided by International Shoe
and its progeny to determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports
with due process.298 Although not every court or jurisdiction seems to be
applying minimum contacts in this regard, any exercise of jurisdiction by a
court must comport with due process and be reasonable in light of “notions of
fair play and substantial justice.”299 Courts and litigants should thus consider
the reasonableness of any exercise of jurisdiction, an analysis focusing on the
particular “relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation” in
each case.300
Therefore, courts looking to pierce for jurisdictional purposes should
consider two questions: (1) whether the veil can be pierced and the entities
treated as one, and (2) whether the assertion of jurisdiction is “reasonable.”301
In many courts, however, this ideal has not been practice, as
federal courts have consistently acknowledged that it is
See supra Section III.B.2.
See supra Section II.B.2; see, e.g., Patin v. Thoroughbred Power Boats Inc., 294 F.3d 640, 653 n.18
(5th Cir. 2002).
298
See supra Section II.B.2.b.
299
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945) (establishing the test for when the
assertion of jurisdiction over alien corporations comports with due process).
300
See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977).
301
See Schwartz, supra note 117, at 739; see also Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 764 (2014)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring).
296
297
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compatible with due process for a court to exercise personal
jurisdiction over an individual or a corporation that would not
ordinarily be subject to personal jurisdiction in that court
when the individual or corporation is an alter ego or
successor of a corporation that would be subject to personal
jurisdiction in that court.302
This is especially so with general jurisdiction as evidenced by dicta in
Bauman noting that the reasonableness inquiry is not a “free-floating test” to
be used in all personal jurisdiction cases, but instead a check “to be essayed
when specific jurisdiction is at issue.”303 Additionally, if courts are going to
pierce the veil and consider the separate parts of the entity as one, then the
court exercising general jurisdiction might view itself as considering a single,
merged entity as “essentially at home” in the forum state, rather than two
separate defendants.304
But one could persuasively argue that “[e]ven if there are grounds to
treat affiliated corporations as one entity for jurisdictional purposes, this does
not necessarily imply that the reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction over a
subsidiary should be imputed to its foreign parent.”305 If that is true, not
separately conducting a reasonableness analysis might create situations in
which the court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the foreign parent violates both
public policy and due process.306 This view, especially when piercing is at
issue, has normative appeal. Therefore, regardless of whether courts
commonly exercise jurisdiction over foreign parents after piercing for
jurisdictional purposes without considering the reasonableness of doing so,
plaintiffs would be wise to show why the exercise of jurisdiction over the
foreign parent is in fact reasonable.
6. Not Always a “Pro-Jurisdiction Answer”
In Bauman, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s agency analysis
because it found that test would always yield a “pro-jurisdiction answer.”307
Thus, although the Court did not comment further on veil piercing or
attribution of contacts between affiliated entities, it did set the outer limit for
any sort of future lower court application. Focusing on the policy of veil
piercing and piercing when the foreign parent used the corporate form to
avoid liability for human rights violations, however, would not always yield
a “pro-jurisdiction answer” and is thus within the outer boundary set by
Patin, 294 F.3d at 653.
See Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20.
304
See Schwartz, supra note 117, at 759.
305
Id. at 760.
306
See id.; see also Nat’l Indus. Sand Ass’n v. Gibson, 897 S.W.2d 769, 773 (Tex. 1995) (describing
the “ultimate due process inquiry” in jurisdictional veil piercing as “whether the out-of-state defendant’s
contact with the forum was such that it should reasonably anticipate being haled into a court in the forum”).
307
134 S. Ct. at 759–60.
302
303
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Bauman.
The Bauman Court was alarmed by the Ninth Circuit’s agency test
because it essentially merged every foreign parent with its subsidiary for the
purposes of jurisdiction.308 The Ninth Circuit’s test only asked whether the
subsidiary’s services were “important” to the parent, “as gauged by [the
parent’s] hypothetical readiness to perform those services itself if [the
subsidiary] did not exist.”309 Thus, the Court noted that “[t]he Ninth Circuit’s
agency theory . . . appears to subject foreign corporations to general
jurisdiction whenever they have an in-state subsidiary or affiliate, an outcome
that would sweep beyond even the ‘sprawling view of general jurisdiction’
[it] rejected in Goodyear.”310
Using the foreign parent’s alleged human rights violations to
establish inequitable conduct under veil-piercing analysis does not subject all
foreign parents to jurisdiction anywhere they have an in-state subsidiary.
Rather, only foreign parent corporations using the corporate form to shield
themselves from amenability to U.S. jurisdiction and ultimately liability for
human rights violations would be affected. And, per the even narrower
analysis discussed in Section III.B.2, only those claims that are sufficiently
domestic under Kiobel will be sufficient to establish the requisite federal
policy to justify piercing.311 While the inquiry might be “pro-jurisdiction” in
that fairly narrow set of cases, such an inquiry does not seem to be the type
that the Court condemned in Bauman, as it did not condemn traditional veilpiercing standards such as the Ninth Circuit’s alter-ego test.312 Insofar as it
relates to the Court’s concern about tests that sweep beyond the “sprawling
view of general jurisdiction” rejected in Goodyear, a test considering human
rights violations in determining whether to pierce is no different (and, indeed,
probably less sprawling) than one considering corporate separateness under
the first factor of traditional three-factor piercing.
7. Cart Before the Horse?
On its face, a potential concern with using inequitable conduct to
pierce the veil to determine jurisdiction is that it puts the cart before the horse;
that is, it seems to determine that the defendant is substantively liable for the
alleged wrongs before the trial, or really pre-trial, has even begun. This is not
unique to using human rights as wrongful conduct in the veil-piercing analysis
to establish jurisdiction—many, if not most, jurisdictional veil-piercing tests
require or consider the alleged wrongful conduct in determining whether to

308
309
310
311
312

Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra Section III.B.2.
See id. at 759.
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pierce for jurisdictional purposes.313 Importantly, however, the general
standard by which courts view and credit jurisdictional facts ensures that
liability is not determined at this early stage.314
In federal courts, when a defendant moves to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating
jurisdiction, but that burden requires the plaintiff to “make only a prima facie
showing of jurisdictional facts to withstand the motion to dismiss.”315 This
means that the plaintiff must “‘adduce evidence of specific facts’ that support
her jurisdictional claim.”316 Then, whether they are disputed or not, the court
takes the specific facts alleged by the plaintiff as true and construes them in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff’s jurisdictional claim.317 The
defendant can also put forth facts, and the court will accept those facts that
are uncontradicted.318 Although conflicting facts will be resolved in the
plaintiff’s favor,319 the court is not required to accept the plaintiff’s conclusory
allegations.320
The current standard is sufficient to ensure there is no significant
“cart before the horse” problem. It is very close to the standard for Rule
12(b)(6),321 and thus the court’s resolution of the jurisdictional question in the
plaintiff’s favor would not decide the substantive issue before trial.
IV. CONCLUSION
Victims of international human rights violations committed by
foreign corporations have a number of hurdles to overcome in bringing their
claims in U.S. courts. The most significant hurdle for such victims seems to
be the Supreme Court’s recent curtailment of general jurisdiction in Bauman,
which apparently shields foreign parents in large, multinational corporations
from being haled into U.S. courts even when the corporation at issue has a
major U.S. subsidiary. The Court has not yet addressed the viability of
piercing the corporate veil as a means to hale the foreign parent into U.S. court
See supra notes 144–47 and accompanying text.
The standard I examine is that of federal courts under Federal Rule 12(b)(2). I do not comment on
the standard used by state courts, except insofar as I note that the federal standard seems appropriate to
avoid the “cart before the horse” problem in any jurisdiction.
315
See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d
1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also O’Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 316 (3d Cir. 2007);
see also Sawtelle v. Farrell, 70 F.3d 1381, 1386 n.1 (1st Cir. 1995); see also Wyatt v. Kaplan, 686 F.2d
276, 280 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting that a plaintiff “need not[] . . . establish personal jurisdiction by a
preponderance of the evidence; prima facie evidence of personal jurisdiction is sufficient”).
316
See Steir v. Girl Scouts of the USA, 218 F. Supp. 2d 58, 62 (D.N.H. 2002) (quoting Foster-Miller,
Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox Can., 46 F.3d 138, 145 (1st Cir. 1995)).
317
See Mass. Sch. of Law v. ABA, 142 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1998); see also Wien Air Alaska, Inc. v.
Brandt, 195 F.3d 208, 212–13 (5th Cir. 1999).
318
See Mass. Sch. of Law, 142 F.3d at 34.
319
See Kelly v. Syria Shell Petroleum Dev. B.V., 213 F.3d 841, 854 (5th Cir. 2000).
320
See Felch v. Transportes Lar-Mex SA DE CV, 92 F.3d 320, 326 n.16 (5th Cir. 1996); Mass Sch. of
Law, 142 F.3d at 34.
321
See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 695–97 (2009).
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in such circumstances. Nonetheless, jurisdictional veil piercing in such
circumstances fits well within both the policies underlying veil piercing and
the framework of existing veil-piercing doctrines. It also serves to implement
an expressed legislative policy to provide relief from and a forum for
international human rights victims. Plaintiffs therefore appear to have a
viable argument that the commission of human rights violations abroad by a
foreign parent with a U.S. subsidiary is a good reason for rejecting corporate
formalities and piercing the veil. Whether courts will accept such arguments
remains to be seen, but they can while remaining within the bounds of current
jurisprudence, and doing so (especially within the limits discussed in this
Article) would be consistent with both the policy of veil piercing and
international human rights law as expressed by Congress.
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